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ABSTRACT
A tremendous amount of individual-level data is generated each day, with a wide variety of uses.
This data often contains sensitive information about individuals, which can be disclosed by
“adversaries”. Even when direct identifiers such as social security numbers are masked, an
adversary may be able to recognize an individual's identity for a data record by looking at the
values of quasi-identifiers (QID), known as identity disclosure, or can uncover sensitive attributes
(SA) about an individual through attribute disclosure. In data privacy field, multiple disclosure
risk measures have been proposed. These share two drawbacks: they do not consider identity and
attribute disclosure concurrently, and they make restrictive assumptions on an adversary's
knowledge and disclosure target by assuming certain attributes are QIDs and SAs with clear
boundary in between. In this study, we present a Flexible Adversary Disclosure Risk (FADR)
measure that addresses these limitations, by presenting a single combined metric of identity and
attribute disclosure, and considering all scenarios for an adversary’s knowledge and disclosure
targets while providing the flexibility to model a specific disclosure preference.
In addition, we employ FADR measure to develop our novel “RU Generalization” algorithm that
anonymizes a sensitive dataset to be able to publish the data for public access while preserving the
privacy of individuals in the dataset. The challenge is to preserve privacy without incurring
excessive information loss. Our RU Generalization algorithm is a greedy heuristic algorithm,
which aims at minimizing the combination of both disclosure risk and information loss, to obtain
an optimized anonymized dataset.
We have conducted a set of experiments on a benchmark dataset from 1994 Census database, to
evaluate both our FADR measure and RU Generalization algorithm. We have shown the
robustness of our FADR measure and the effectiveness of our RU Generalization algorithm by
comparing with the benchmark anonymization algorithm.

vi
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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview
A tremendous amount of data about people is generated every day, by business, healthcare, and
government computer systems and by Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as cell phones and
activity monitoring wristwatches. This information is useful to marketing, decision makers, and
researchers, in particular individual level data (aka microdata) which can be used for detailed
modeling and machine learning. However, microdata usually contains private and sensitive
information about individuals and thus is considered confidential. Consequently, these datasets
cannot be made freely available for public access.
For instance, Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are a significant source for medical research
purposes. Because of private data on identity, demographics, and health conditions, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [1] restricts access to EHR and preserves
the privacy of patients in the system. Similarly, FERPA and other federal and state legislation
governs privacy of sensitive datasets containing individual level data such as those from student’s
school enrollment, performance, and disciplinary information, Department of Correction (DOC)
records, and Office of Juvenile Justice (OJJ) records. Yet this data has significant potential in
helping identify problems and improve performance of services in these areas.
This raises the question of how data owners can share their data for research purposes while not
violating individuals’ privacy. This problem has been recently studied in depth, in two relatively
close areas; Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) and Privacy Preserving Data Publishing
(PPDP). They are both sharing the same concepts in the field of data privacy, with a little
difference in their methodologies.
In SDC, confidential microdata is modified such that third parties working with these data are
prevented to recognize individuals in the dataset. SDC techniques include sampling, adding noise,
rounding, data swapping, etc.
In PPDP area, various privacy models are proposed, each specifies a privacy requirement. A
privacy requirement assures that the privacy of individuals in a confidential dataset is preserved
up to a certain level. Thus, by applying privacy techniques on a confidential microdata, it satisfies
a privacy requirement and then it is ready to be published for public access.
SDC and PPDP both aim at creating privacy preserved version of a confidential dataset. The output
protected dataset needs to be evaluated with respect to two criteria; privacy and data utility.
Evaluating the privacy of a protected dataset is done by measuring disclosure risk. Disclosure risk
is a measure indicating how much the output dataset is protected in terms of individual’s privacy
and how much the individuals are at risk of having their confidential information disclosed. Data
utility is a measure showing how much original information is lost in the output dataset due to the
1

changes made on the original dataset. The goal is to have an approach that minimizes the disclosure
risk while maximizing the data utility.
Microdata typically includes three types of attributes of concern from a privacy perspective: Direct
Identifiers, Quasi-Identifiers (QID), and Sensitive Attributes (SA).
Direct identifiers are the attributes which are unique per person and a record can be easily matched
to an individual by seeing a direct identifier in that record, such as social security number, phone
number, or email address. For privacy preservation, these attributes need to be removed from the
data. They are often replaced by randomly assigned identifiers in order to be able to relate multiple
records of individual data.
This by itself does not guarantee de-identification of the data because there might be other data
fields, named quasi-identifiers (QID), such as birthdate, gender, and zip code, any one of which
are not unique to a person, but when they are considered together, with high probability, the
combination of QID field values can be used to identify individuals. This identification may occur
when an "adversary" determines a person’s quasi-identifiers values from publicly available data
(local census data, voter lists, tax assessors, or real estate agencies, Facebook …) or personal
knowledge, and uses this information to match against quasi-identifiers appearing in the
confidential dataset. For example Sweeney [2] demonstrated discovering the medical record of the
governor of Massachusetts from data released by the Group Insurance Commission, after obtaining
the governor’s QID-values from public sources. 87% of U.S. citizens can be uniquely recognized
in datasets using only their birth date, gender, and 5-digit zip code [2].
Sensitive attributes (SA) contain private and confidential information about an individual.
Sensitive attributes are those that PPDP is mainly concerned about protecting from association
with specific individuals.
In order to preserve the privacy of people in a dataset, it is required to know what the threats to
their privacy are. Three main privacy threats have been introduced: Identity Disclosure Threat,
Attribute Disclosure Threat, and Membership Disclosure Threat. These threats come from an
adversary who wants to disclose private information of a person, referred to as a victim.
Identity Disclosure occurs when an adversary can recognize that a record in the released dataset
belongs to an individual. In this case, the adversary knows the QID values of a victim and can
match those with the QIDs of the published confidential dataset and find a matching record
belonging to that person.
Attribute Disclosure occurs when an adversary can link a sensitive value to an individual. Here
the adversary may not precisely identify a record of a specific victim but could infer his/her
sensitive values from the published data, based on the set of sensitive values associated with the
group that the victim belongs to.
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Membership Disclosure occurs when an adversary can determine the existence of an individual in
the published dataset when the membership of the person in that dataset itself counts as private
information. This means the presence or the absence of the person’s record in the released dataset
already reveals private information.
In PPDP area, different privacy models are proposed for thwarting these threats and we will review
them in depth in Chapter 2.

1.2 Problem Statement
Most disclosure risk measures proposed in the literature address only identity disclosure attack.
These risk measures are defined based on either uniqueness or re-identification. In uniqueness
measures, risk is defined as the probability that the rare combination of QID values in the privacypreserved dataset is indeed rare in the population dataset [3]. Re-identification methods estimate
the number of re-identifications an adversary can obtain by matching QIDs from external
knowledge against confidential dataset through record linkage algorithms [4-8]. Re-identification
methods require the assumption of knowing the exact external knowledge for an adversary.
Domingo-Ferrer addressed this issue by proposing the “maximum knowledge attacker model”,
which considers an adversary who knows the values of all QIDs in the confidential dataset about
a victim [9].
Although identity disclosure risk measures have been studied in depth, very few works proposed
approaches to measure attribute disclosure attacks. Some studies proposed classification accuracy
as a measure of attribute disclosure after using classifiers to predict the categorical sensitive
attribute values [10, 11]. Various privacy models for attribute disclosure have been proposed.
However, instead of measuring the risk of attribute disclosure, they specify a Boolean condition
in which the dataset is prevented from attribute disclosure if it satisfies the condition [12]. For
instance, Machanavajjhala et al. proposed a privacy model named “ℓ-Diversity”, which requires
the records with similar values in their QIDs have diverse sensitive values [13]. As another privacy
model, “t-closeness” requires the distribution of sensitive values in each group of records with
similar QID values to be close to the overall distribution [14].
A drawback of existing identity disclosure risk measures and attribute disclosure privacy models
is that they classify specific attributes as QIDs and SAs, with a clear boundary in between. This
limits an adversary’s external knowledge to specific QIDs and the disclosure target to specific
SAs. In reality, many adversaries exist with different external knowledge and disclosure targets.
A sensitive attribute for an adversary can be a disclosure target, whereas another adversary might
know that attribute about a victim and use that as a QID. Some work has been done to find QIDs
by defining measures such as distinct ratio and separation ratio [15]. These measures are defined
based on value frequencies in different combinations of attribute such that the combinations that
lead to more unique values are more likely to form QIDs.

3

Since a privacy preserved microdata is evaluated in terms of disclosure risk and data utility, the
optimum privacy technique is the one that results in a dataset with minimum disclosure risk and
maximum data utility. However, there is always a trade-off between preserving privacy and data
utility. Because, the more changes we make on the confidential dataset to reduce disclosure risk,
the more information the data loses and the less data utility it preserves. Thus, developing an
optimum privacy technique seems to be infeasible. Nevertheless, it has been the subject of recent
studies to improve privacy techniques to achieve higher data utility while not losing privacy.
In recent studies, researchers have been interested in handling multiple sensitive attributes because
initially proposed privacy models just consider single SA. Extending an initial privacy model to
address multiple SAs needs a modification in its definition that preserves each SA separately.
Using former algorithms to employ redefined model incurs huge information loss because the
privacy requirement has become stricter. Thus, new privacy techniques need to be proposed to
preserve all sensitive attributes and protect data utility at the same time. The algorithms for these
techniques also need to be efficient to work with a large number of SAs.
One problem with recent studies addressing multiple SAs is that proposed algorithms are evaluated
based on only a few sensitive attributes (less than 10). For instance, Wang and Zhu presented a
novel algorithm that can thwart different attacks to SAs but it is just limited to two SAs and
extension of their work is left for future work [16].
Another challenge with multiple SAs that is not well addressed in the literature is that sensitive
attributes may have different characteristics and there is no comprehensive privacy model that can
consider all these features. For example, “ℓ-Diversity” is a well-known privacy model for
preserving categorical SA but it doesn’t work with highly skewed SAs or numerical SAs [13]. On
the other hand some models like “(𝑘, 𝑒)- anonymity” [17] or “(𝜀, 𝑚) - anonymity” [18] are
proposed just to handle numerical sensitive attributes. Also to handle highly skewed SAs, “tcloseness” is presented [19]. In case of handling multiple sensitive attributes, Liu et al. proposed
a method to handle multiple numeric sensitive attributes [20]. SLOMS is another approach for
handling multiple SAs that is based on ℓ -Diversity privacy model and thereby not so appropriate
for numeric SAs [21].
In addition, when the dataset contains many sensitive attributes, they may be in different levels of
sensitivity, meaning that some SA may contain more sensitive information than others. For
instance, consider “Disease” and “Occupation” as sensitive attributes of people in a dataset.
“Disease” is considered more sensitive than “Occupation” and people are stricter in keeping their
disease information personal and private compared to their occupation information.
Even within one sensitive attribute, some values can be more sensitive than others especially for
binary attributes. For example, consider a sensitive attribute Dropout Flag which shows whether
a student has dropped out of school (Y) or not (N). Having Dropout Flag as ‘Y’ is more sensitive
than ‘N’ and in terms of preserving the privacy; it is more important to hide the identification of
students who have dropped out of school.
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Having different sensitivity level, either between SAs or between values within one SA, is not
addressed among recent studies dealing with multiple SAs. If we consider these characteristics for
our sensitive attributes, we may be able to relax some privacy requirements and therefore better
preserves data utility.

1.3 Objectives
The objectives of this study are:
1. Develop Flexible Adversary Disclosure Risk (FADR) measure, as a novel disclosure risk
measure which:
a. Captures both identity and attribute disclosure attack
b. Models all possible kinds of knowledge for adversary
c. Considers different sensitivity levels of sensitive attributes
d. Considers different sensitivity levels of values within one sensitive attribute
2. Develop a pruning algorithm to handle calculation efficiency of FADR measure when
considering all possible kinds of knowledge for adversary and having many sensitive
attributes
3. Develop an optimization algorithm to minimize both disclosure risk and information loss
through generalization
4. Develop an algorithm to calculate FADR measure on a generalized dataset assuming the
maximum knowledge adversary
a. Compare the FADR and information loss measures on the generalized dataset
obtained from our optimization algorithm and benchmark algorithms

5
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LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Privacy Models
In the literature, privacy models have been classified in three basic categories with respect to the
three privacy threats: models against identity-disclosure, attribute-disclosure, and membershipdisclosure. A privacy model formulates privacy requirements and objectives that are accomplished
by the algorithms that are also focusing on data utility objectives.
In this chapter, we introduce both fundamental and recent models within each category
accompanied by the algorithms.

2.1.1 Privacy Models against Identity Disclosure
These models try to thwart identity disclosure attacks through record linkage between the
published dataset and an available external dataset.

Figure 1. Example of k-anonymity, where QIDs are (Race, Birth, Gender, and ZIP) and k=2 [2]

An older but fundamental model is called k-anonymity [2]. K-anonymity can be counted as a
baseline for later models. It prevents record linkage as any individual can be matched with at least
k records in the published dataset based on their quasi-identifiers. This is achieved by transforming
quasi-identifiers and creating groups of at least k records with equal quasi-identifiers called
equivalence classes. It limits the probability of identifying an individual in the published dataset
down to 1/K. For instance, Figure 1 illustrates a 2-anonymity data table with race, birth year,
gender, and zip code as QIDs and it contains 5 equivalence classes in which QID values are the
same. Here, zip code is the only QID that is generalized by hiding its last digit. According to this
anonymized data table, if an adversary wants to disclose the information of a victim who is a black
6

female, born in 1964, and lives in 02137 zip code, he can find 2 records having this characteristics
and therefore cannot find the exact record belonging to that victim.
Since k-anonymity is originally defined for single-table datasets, one of its extensions is multirelational k-anonymity which supports anonymization in multi-relational database schema [22].
However, it has been shown that using single-table k-anonymity algorithms for multiple relation
setting either fails in protecting identity disclosure, or excessively reduces data utility of the
anonymized dataset. For this model, the definition of quasi-identifier and k-anonymity are
modified, and specific data utility measures are proposed to fit multi-relational setting.
Transactional data or so-called “set-valued” data are treated differently in terms of preserving
privacy. Purchased items for a customer or diagnosis codes for a patient are examples of this kind
of data. The privacy threat for these data occurs when an adversary has some knowledge about an
individual’s subset of transactional data. Terrovitis et al. have proposed 𝐾 𝑚 anonymity model as
an extension of basic k-anonymity model that avoids the association of a specific transaction to a
particular person [23]. Since the knowledge of the adversary is not known by the data publisher,
𝐾 𝑚 anonymity model assumes that the maximum knowledge of an adversary is at most m items
of a transaction and therefore it enforces the anonymization by requiring each set of m or less items
to appear in at least k records of the released dataset.
He and Naughton addressed the limitations of 𝐾 𝑚 anonymity [24]. They stated that the choice of
safe m for 𝐾 𝑚 anonymity is sometimes impossible. Because it may happen that based on the
background knowledge of an adversary about a victim, extra items other than those m items in a
transaction cannot be matched with the victim; therefore, less than k records will be remained for
being linked to the victim and that increases the risk of identity disclosure. Thus, in response to
these drawbacks, He and Naughton used basic k-anonymity model instead, i.e., for any transaction
there should be at least k−1 other identical transactions in the released dataset.

2.1.2 Privacy Models against Attribute Disclosure
These models prevent sensitive attribute disclosure for an individual. As described in Chapter 1,
thwarting identity disclosure does not guarantee preventing attribute disclosure. Sometimes you
may find multiple records matching an individual (like a k-anonymity dataset), therefore, you can
claim that the identity disclosure for that person is prevented. However, it is possible that among
those multiple matching records (equivalence class), sensitive attributes have unique values. In
this case, regardless of knowing which record in the equivalence class belongs to that individual,
the sensitive value is revealed and this is where attribute disclosure occurs. For instance, back in
Figure 1, assume that Problem is the sensitive attribute. If a victim is a black female, born in 1965,
and lives in the 02138 zip code, then although the adversary is finding 2 matched records for this
victim, he will find that the victim has hypertension problem and therefore the private information
of the victim is revealed. This is called homogeneity attack on k-anonymity, which leads to
sensitive attribute disclosure. There is also another attack on k-anonymity model, called
background knowledge attack, which can disclose the sensitive attribute of an individual by
7

excluding from the equivalence class those sensitive attributes that are not probable to be
associated with that individual based on the background knowledge of the adversary.
Machanavajjhala et al. described these two attacks and proposed a new model, named “ℓDiversity”, against attribute disclosure in order to thwart the aforementioned attacks and address
the shortcomings of k-anonymity [13]. ℓ-Diversity requires each equivalence class to contain at
least ℓ ‘‘well represented’’ sensitive attribute (SA) values. The simplest interpretation of ‘‘well
represented’’ is distinct, and leads to “Distinct ℓ-Diversity”, which enforces the equivalence class
to have at least ℓ distinct SA values. Some variations of ℓ-Diversity with respect to the
interpretation of “well represented” are as follows:
Entropy ℓ -Diversity, in which for every equivalence class E;
− ∑ 𝑝(𝐸, 𝑠) log(𝑝(𝐸, 𝑠)) ≥ log(ℓ)

(1)

𝑠∈𝑆

where 𝑝(𝐸, 𝑠) is the fraction of records in E that have the sensitive value s and S is SA domain.
This criteria actually enforces that each equivalence class not only must have enough different
sensitive values, but also the different sensitive values must be distributed evenly enough.



Recursive (c,ℓ)-Diversity, which requires each class to contain a large number of distinct
SA values, none of which appears too often or too rare.
Positive Disclosure-Recursive (c, ℓ)-Diversity and Negative/Positive DisclosureRecursive (c, ℓ)-Diversity, which capture background knowledge of an adversary and
consider the cases in which some values of SA do not require protection since they are
too frequent or they may not pose a threat to privacy.

There are other similar models to ℓ-Diversity, such as the “p-sensitive k-anonymity” model [25]
in which parameter p acts like ℓ in Distinct ℓ -Diversity, and the “(α,k)-anonymity” model [26] in
which the frequency (fraction) of a sensitive value in each equivalence class is no more than α.
Both of these models enforce k-anonymity at the beginning to create equivalence classes and then
protect SA in those classes. Although these models seem similar, they differ in their applied
algorithms and we will introduce these algorithms in the “Privacy Techniques” section of this
chapter.
A year after ℓ-Diversity was introduced, Ninghui et al. addressed two attacks on ℓ-Diversity:
skewness attack and similarity attack, both of which can cause disclosure of the sensitive value(s)
for an individual [19]. They proved that if the overall distribution of the sensitive attribute values
is highly skewed (skewness attack) and also known to the adversary, or if the sensitive values
within each equivalence class are distinct but semantically close to each other (similarity attack),
then ℓ-Diversity cannot protect sensitive attributes. They generalized the background knowledge
attack by replacing the prior belief of the adversary about an individual’s SA with the global
background knowledge that is the distribution of SA in the whole population. Therefore, they
8

proposed a new privacy model called “t-closeness” in which the distance between the distribution
of a sensitive attribute in each equivalence class and the distribution of the attribute in the whole
table is no more than a threshold t. They used Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [27] to compute
the distance between distributions.
Recently, Soria-Comas et al. proposed a new study on t-closeness model in which they used a
different privacy technique for creating equivalence classes than the one in the original model [14].
In fact, they used a micro-aggregation technique instead of generalization in order to create kanonymous data and apply the t-closeness model, and they proved that changing generalization to
micro-aggregation improves the data utility. We will explain these techniques in the “Privacy
Techniques” section.
Later, Ninghui et al. extended their proposed model to a more flexible model called “(n,t)closeness” in order to achieve a better balance between privacy and utility [28]. In this model,
instead of considering the sensitive values in the whole population, it limits the amount of sensitive
information about the individuals by looking through a group with minimum size of ‘n’. In fact,
it enforces the distribution of any equivalence class to be close to the distribution of at least one
superset of that equivalence class containing at least n records, with respect to the sensitive
attribute. The other novelty of this work is that they addressed the limitation of EMD for
computing the distance between distributions and therefore proposed a novel distance measure
based on kernel smoothing that satisfies all of the required properties.
Thwarting similarity attacks is the subject of recent studies. This attack may be applied against
either categorical or numerical sensitive attributes. Following we discuss this issue in more depth,
along with the recent related works for both categorical and numeric sensitive attributes.
Similarity Attack on Numeric Sensitive Attribute
When the sensitive attribute is numeric, having diverse sensitive values is not sufficient for
preventing attribute disclosure attack. Although the sensitive values are distinct, they all may fall
into a short interval. For example, if a sensitive attribute is ‘salary’, by looking at the anonymized
released table the adversary may find that an individual's salary (say, "Mary"), can possibly be
$10k, $11k, $13k, or $15k. Although the adversary will not know the exact value of Mary’s salary,
they will find that it is within the range of $10k and $15k, which is a short enough interval to
determine that Mary has a low income and thereby threatens her privacy. In the literature, this
issue is referred to as a similarity attack on a numeric sensitive attribute, a proximity breach, or a
range disclosure.
One of the foundational models dealing with proximity breach was proposed by Zhang et al. called
“(k,e)- Anonymity” [17]. This model restricts each equivalence class to have at least k different
sensitive values with a range of at least e. One drawback of the (k,e)-Anonymity model is that it
doesn’t consider the distribution of sensitive values within a range in an equivalence class. Thus,
regardless of having a wide range of values, if some sensitive values occur frequently within that
9

range, the adversary can still find that an individual is more likely to be linked to the more frequent
values within that range.
The following year, another model, “(𝜀, 𝑚)-anonymity” was proposed to address the
aforementioned limitation of the (k,e)- Anonymity model [29]. (𝜀, 𝑚)-anonymity holds that, given
an equivalence class E, for every sensitive value x in E at most 1/m of its tuples can have sensitive
values similar to x. Being similar to x is quantified by parameter 𝜀. For instance, two values are
similar if their absolute difference is at most 𝜀. Later, Li et al. proposed a more effective algorithm
to achieve (𝜀, 𝑚)-anonymity than the one originally proposed in terms of gaining better data utility
and less computation time [18].
Loukides et al. addressed some new issues on range disclosure attack which had not been solved
in prior work [30]. Although the proposed approach considered numeric sensitive attribute, it can
also be applied to the categorical sensitive attribute as well. Their method also introduced a privacy
measure, called Range Diversity that allows anonymizers to specify detailed protection
requirements for sensitive ranges, and quantifies the amount of protection for ranges by taking
both positive and negative disclosure into account. This approach measured the probability of
disclosing any range in the least protected equivalence class of a table, and captures the way
sensitive attribute values form ranges in a class, based on their frequency and similarity. Through
their experiments, the authors also showed that their approach achieved significantly lower data
utility loss than the (𝜀, 𝑚)-anonymity approach by measuring data utility for the same runs of the
algorithms using two different criteria for data utility metrics: Worst Group Utility (WGU) [31]
and Average Utility (AU) [32].
An issue that is not covered in the above studies is the problem of having multiple numeric
sensitive attributes and trying to protect the set from similarity attack. Liu et al. proposed a method
to address this issue [33]. Their method uses the appropriate privacy techniques such as clustering
and multi-sensitive bucketization (MSB). However, this paper does not present an algorithm to
achieve this method.
Similarity Attack on Categorical Sensitive Attribute
Similarity attack on categorical sensitive attribute is also known as semantic attack. This is the
case when sensitive values in an equivalence class are distinct but semantically similar. For
instance, an equivalence class has ‘gastric ulcer’, ‘gastritis’, and ‘stomach cancer’ as distinct
sensitive values for ‘disease’ sensitive attribute. Although these are distinct, they are semantically
related and if an individual is linked to this class, an adversary will know that he has stomachrelated disease.
The prior studies on thwarting similarity attack, focused on numeric sensitive attributes and their
proposed models do not work for categorical sensitive attribute. However, Wang et al. proposed
“(k, ε)- Anonymity” model based on the semantic similarity to thwarting similarity attack [34].
This model requires that each equivalence class in anonymous dataset satisfy k-anonymity
10

constraints and at the same time, any two sensitive values in the same equivalence class are not ε
-similar. The definition of the ε –similar is based on the semantic hierarchical tree of a sensitive
attribute. According to this approach, semantic similarity between two values can be measured by
the path length between the two values on this tree.

Figure 2. The semantic hierarchical tree for a disease attribute [34]

For example, Figure 2 is a semantic hierarchical tree of the disease attribute. As shown in this
tree, ‘gastric ulcer’ and ‘gastritis’ have a common parent on the tree, so they are semantically
similar.
However, ‘flu’ and ‘gastritis’ have only a common great grandparent, so they are comparatively
dissimilar. Semantic distance is defined such that two sensitive values 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 are ε-similar if:
(ℎ1 − ℎ𝑐 ) + (ℎ2 − ℎ𝑐 )
(2)
≥ 𝜀
2
where ℎ1 and ℎ2 are the level of 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 in the semantic hierarchical tree and ℎ𝑐 is the level of
their closest common ancestor. In Figure 2, ‘gastric ulcer’ and ‘gastritis’ are 1-similar and ‘flu’
and ‘gastritis’ are 3-similar.

2.1.3 Privacy Models against Membership Disclosure
Knowing the existence of an individual in a dataset can pose a privacy risk. Therefore, here we
will present the models in the literature that attempt to thwart attacks aimed at identifying the
existence of an individual in an anonymized dataset.
Nergiz et al. proposed the first model called “-presence” [35]. -presence is a metric to evaluate
the risk of identifying an individual in a table based on generalization of publicly known data. This
model assures that the membership disclosure is protected when the probability of inferring that
an individual’s record is contained in a sensitive database is within a range (min, max) of
acceptable probabilities. The parameters min and max are specified by data publisher who also
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need to possess the population table P. P is assumed to contain ‘‘all publicly known data’’ (i.e.,
the direct identifiers and quasi-identifiers of all individuals in the population, including those in
D).
-presence has a drawback that requires data owners to have access to complete information about
the population, in the form of table P. Thus, the authors tried to overcome this limitation and
improve their method by presenting a modified version of -presence, which is “c-Confident presence” [36]. “c-Confident -presence” assumes a set of distribution functions for the population
(i.e., attackers know the probability that an individual is associated with one or more values, over
one or more attributes) instead of table P, and ensures that a record is -present with respect to the
population with an owner-specified probability c.

2.2 Privacy Techniques
A common theme among privacy models is creating equivalence classes. This initially came from
the “k-anonymity” model that forces creation of equivalence classes by generalizing quasiidentifiers in a way that all records in one equivalence class have the same values of quasiidentifiers. Later on, this became a privacy technique used for employing most of the privacy
models either for identity-disclosure prevention or for attribute-disclosure prevention. The
prevention of identity disclosure requires transforming quasi-identifiers in order to create
equivalence classes in a way that it achieves privacy model requirement and data utility objectives
as well. The later ensures that preserving the data privacy will not make data lose excessive
information. Since transforming the data to achieve privacy and optimal utility is computationally
infeasible, most algorithms adopt heuristic strategies to explore the space of possible solutions, i.e.
they consider different ways of transforming quasi-identifiers in order to find a ‘‘good’’ solution
that satisfies privacy and the utility objective. Therefore, the algorithms to employ privacy models
usually consist of data transformation, data utility measure, and heuristic strategies to search for
the “good” solution.
In the following section, we introduce transformation methods, utility objectives, and heuristic
strategies addressed in the literature, and then go through the algorithms using these techniques.

2.2.1 Anonymization Operations
Transforming Quasi-Identifiers
There are three main anonymization operations for transforming QIDs of the similar records to be
in an equivalence class: Generalization, Suppression, and Micro-aggregation.
Fung et al. presented different forms of generalization and suppression methods as anonymization
operations in their recent survey [37].
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Figure 3. Generalization Hierarchy for Job, Sex, and Age [37].

The most common method found in the literature is generalization. Generalization replaces quasiidentifier’s value by more general, but semantically consistent, values. Each QID has a
generalization hierarchy tree, called taxonomy tree, which shows the values of the attribute as the
leaves of the tree and the parent nodes are the generalized values. Figure 3, shows the taxonomy
trees for QIDs Job, Sex, and Age.
The two main models of generalization are “global recoding” and “local recoding”. In global
recoding, all values of a quasi-identifier will be generalized to a same level. In contrast, local
recoding generalizes those values differently; some instances may not be even generalized. For
example, for local recoding, in one partition, age can be generalized to 10 years interval while in
the other partition it is generalized to 5 years interval. But for global recoding, all partitions have
age interval of 10 years. Therefore, compared with global recoding, local recoding is more flexible,
and therefore it produces a smaller information loss. However, this flexibility may cause data
exploration problems. For example, two instances may be treated differently in a data-mining task
since they are generalized differently.
Suppression also appears in different formats: Record suppression refers to suppressing an entire
record; Value suppression refers to suppressing every instance of a given value in a table; and Cell
suppression (or local suppression) refers to suppressing specific instances of a given value in a
table.
It is not only possible but also common for the algorithms to apply both generalization and
suppression at the same time. For example, Loukides et al. employ suppression when it is not
possible to apply generalization while satisfying some utility requirements [38].
Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. also added a “Micro-aggregation” method to the above transformation
techniques [39]. This involves replacing a group of values in a quasi-identifier, using a summary
statistic (e.g., centroid or median for numerical and categorical QIDs, respectively). This approach
may harm data truthfulness, i.e., the centroid may not appear in the data.
Permutation-Based
Permutation-based approaches do not make any change to the values of the quasi-identifiers. In
fact, they leave them intact to preserve more information and instead they break the association
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between quasi-identifier attributes and sensitive attribute by permuting the sensitive attribute in
order to prevent attribute disclosure. Therefore, you cannot certainly link any record to one
sensitive value since that value is permuted and is not the original value for that person.
One method used for this kind of operation is “Bucketization”. In bucketization, the step of
creating equivalence classes remains the same as generalization but within each class, called a
bucket, instead of generalizing the quasi-identifier’s values, it separates the sensitive values from
quasi-identifiers by randomly permuting the sensitive values within each bucket [40].
Zhang et al. compared generalization to permutation on the same partitioning and found that since
in permutation QID values are remained intact, aggregate query answering is more accurate on
permuted data than generalized data [17].

2.2.2 Data Utility Objectives
Satisfying privacy constraints based on the privacy model is one side of PPDP algorithms. The
other side is retaining information so that the published data remains practically useful. There
are three broad categories of information metrics for measuring data usefulness: General Purpose
Metrics, Specific Purpose Metrics, and Trade-off Metrics.
General Purpose Metrics
In many cases, the data publisher does not know how the published data will be used and analyzed
by the recipient. Therefore, they generally compare the anonymous data with the original data and
quantify information loss incurred by data transformation in terms of an optimization measure,
which they attempt to minimize. Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. classified these metrics into the
following two groups [39]:
1. Metrics that look at the size of equivalence class:
Since the records within an equivalence class share the same values over quasi-identifier,
they become indistinguishable from one another and therefore if each equivalence class
contains many records, that means we have high information loss. Examples of these
metrics include:


Discernibility Metric (DM): charging a penalty to each record for being
indistinguishable from other records with respect to QID.
𝐶𝐷𝑀 =

∑

|𝐸|2

𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐸



Normalized Average Equivalence Class Size:
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝐶𝐴𝑉𝐺 = (
) /(𝑘)
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
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The drawback of this group of metrics is that they ignore the way values are transformed within
each class while more generalized values lose more information compared with less generalized
values. This motivates next group of metrics.
2. Metrics that penalize more generalized values include [39]




Minimal Distortion (MD): each level of generalization is assigned 1 unit of distortion
for each value. For example, for attribute Job, looking at Figure 3, if 10 records with
Engineer value generalized to Professional, 10 units of distortion occurs (1 unit for
each record). While, if these records are generalized to Any, 20 units of distortion
occurs (2 units for each record) because of having 2 levels of generalization.
Normalized Certainty Penalty (NCP): charging a penalty of |𝑣𝑔 |/|𝐴| to each
generalized instance value (𝑣𝑔 ) of attribute A. |𝑣𝑔 | is the number of leaf nodes in the
generalization hierarchy of A that are descendants of 𝑣𝑔 . |𝐴| is the total number of
domain values of the attribute A. For example, for one instance of the generalized
value Artist in attribute Job, the penalty is 2/4 = 0.5. NCP for a record is derived as
the summation of NCP of all attribute values of that record and finally NCP for a
dataset is the summation of NCP of all records.

Specific Purpose Metrics
If we know the tasks the data will be used for, we can take those tasks into account during
anonymization to better retain information. Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. mentioned two instances of
data usage tasks and their proposed information metric in the literature [39]:




Data Classification task: The proposed metric is Classification Metric (CM) which looks
at the number of records whose class labels are different from that of the majority of
records in their equivalence class, normalized by the dataset size.
Aggregate Query Answering tasks: The proposed metric is Average Relative Error
(ARE) that measures the difference between the answers to a query using the anonymized
dataset and the original dataset.

Trade-off Metrics
In the two aforementioned types of metrics, we look at data utility objective apart from satisfying
privacy model. This means that we choose an anonymized dataset that preserves the most
information. However, trade-off metrics consider both privacy and information requirements at
the same time of every anonymization operation and determine an optimal trade-off between the
two requirements. For instance, a metric proposed in the literature is the ratio between information
gain and the privacy loos [38]. It aims at maximizing information gain per each loos of privacy.
The definition of information gain and privacy loos depends on the information metric and privacy
model.
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2.2.3 Heuristic Strategies
The problem of creating a dataset satisfying a privacy model's requirement while optimally
preserving the data utility objectives is NP-hard. As mentioned before, optimally anonymizing
data with respect to the aforementioned data utility criteria is computationally infeasible.
Consequently, heuristic strategies are employed in the algorithms to find sets of equivalence
classes heuristically. In a survey studied by Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. a good classification of these
strategies are presented in the following subsections [39].
Searching Strategies
These strategies are applied when using generalization to transform quasi-identifiers and create
equivalence classes. They create a generalization hierarchy, called taxonomy, for each quasiidentifier attribute separately and then combine those taxonomies for all quasi-identifier attributes,
to obtain a lattice. Thus, finding a way to generalize values can be performed by exploring the
lattice using heuristics that avoid considering certain lattice nodes for efficiency reasons. Here are
examples of heuristic lattice search methods [39]:




Binary lattice search
Apriori-like lattice search
Genetic lattice search

Binary lattice search prunes the ascendants of lattice nodes that are sufficient to satisfy a privacy
model while Apriori-like and Genetic lattice search prune lattice nodes that are likely to incur high
utility loss.
Binary and Apriori-like lattice search strategies explore a small space of potential solutions and
thus may fail to preserve data utility to the extent that genetic search strategies can do. However,
genetic search is computationally intensive. Thus, more recent studies have focused on grouping
strategies.
Grouping Strategies
As opposed to searching strategies, grouping strategies work on the records not the quasi-identifier
values. They split the records into groups iteratively in a way to find a “good” anonymized dataset
heuristically with respect to the privacy and utility. Here are the examples of heuristic grouping
strategies:




Data Partitioning: Chooses a quasi-identifier to split the records into two groups based
on the values on that attribute. Each group will have similar values with respect to that
quasi-identifier the splitting was based on. This method iteratively does the splitting
within each group in order to get a satisfactory dataset.
Data Clustering: In contrast to partitioning, clustering merges two groups of records
based on the values of all quasi-identifier attributes together.
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Space Mapping: It ranks the records based on the values of quasi-identifiers. In fact,
records with similar values in quasi-identifiers have similar ranks. It then records which
consecutive ranks will form a group by satisfying privacy and utility requirements.

Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. compared partitioning-based methods with clustering-based methods and
concluded that partitioning-based methods incur higher utility loss and perform poorly when the
dataset is skewed and also they are sensitive to the choice of the splitting attribute. However, it is
worth noting that partitioning is faster than clustering by orders of magnitude, requiring
O(n.log(n)) time instead of O(n2), where n is the cardinality of the dataset. The authors also
pointed that space-mapping techniques achieve good efficiency, as the ranking can be calculated
in linear time, as well as being effective at preserving data utility.

2.2.4 Algorithms
In this section, we introduce some algorithms for employing privacy models while preserving data
utility. These algorithms are demonstrated in

Table 1, showing their satisfied privacy model, the anonymization operation used, the data utility
metric, and also the applied heuristic strategy to come up with the optimal solution.
Incognito was initially proposed by LeFevre et al. for efficiently employing k-anonymity model
[41]. It searches through a lattice of all possible global recoding generalizations of quasi-identifiers
and tries to find the one with the minimum distortion (MD), i.e., the one with least generalized
values. The enforced searching strategy is Apriori-like method that uses Breadth-First Search
algorithm and aims at efficient searching by utilizing monotonicity property of k-anonymity that
reduces the searching space. Monotonicity property is saying that if a table is k-anonymous, then
every generalization of that table is also k-anonymous.
When the ℓ-Diversity model was proposed, the suggested algorithm to produce optimal ℓ-Diverse
data was Incognito as well. Machanavajjhala et al. stated that ℓ-Diversity also possesses the
monotonicity property, i.e., if a table is ℓ-Diverse then every generalization of that table is also ℓDiverse, and therefore they employed their model by using Incognito algorithm in the same way
as it was used for k-anonymity except that in their work Incognito satisfied ℓ-Diversity privacy
constraints [13].
Similarly, t-closeness was initially employed by Incognito. Li et al. could prove that if a table
satisfies t-closeness, any further generalized version of that table also satisfies t-closeness. Again
this implies monotonicity property and motivates the implementation of Incognito algorithm [19].
Mondrian multidimensional partitioning algorithm enforces the k-anonymity model by recursively
greedy partitioning the space based on a selected quasi-identifier. In each iteration of the
algorithm, the data will be partitioned into two roughly even sized regions and the algorithm is
recursively called for each of the two created regions and continues till no more partitions can be
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created according to the k-anonymity constraint. In this study, the data utility is measured by
Discernibility Metric and also by the specific purpose metric which focuses on answering
aggregated queries accurately [42].

Table 1. Algorithms for employing privacy models and preserving data utility
Algorithm

Anonymization
Operation
Generalization &
Suppression

Data Utility Metric

Mondrian

Privacy
Model
K-anonymity
&
ℓ -Diversity &
t-closeness
K-anonymity

Generalization

Mondrian

t-closeness

Generalization

DM & Aggregate
Query Answering
NCP

LSD Mondrian

K-anonymity

Generalization

Regression Accuracy

Infogain
Mondrian
KACA

K-anonymity

Generalization

K-anonymity

Generalization

Hilbert &
iDistance

K-anonymity
&
ℓ -Diversity
t-closeness

Generalization

Classification
Accuracy
Minimal Distortion
(MD)
Normalized Certainty
Penalty (NCP)

Incognito

t-Closeness-First
Microaggregation
SPALM /
MPALM

-Presence

Minimal Distortion
(MD)

Microaggregation Sum of Squared Error
(SSE)
Generalization
Minimal Distortion
(MD)

SFALM

c-Confident Presence

Generalization

Minimal Distortion
(MD)

Slicing

K-anonymity
&
ℓ -Diversity

Bucketization

DM & Classification
Accuracy

Heuristic
Strategy
Apriorilike lattice
search
Data
Partitioning
Data
Partitioning
Data
Partitioning
Data
Partitioning
Data
Clustering
Space
Mapping
Data
Clustering
Top-down
lattice
search
Top-down
lattice
search
Data
Partitioning

This Mondrian algorithm was extended to be adopted for different class of workload-aware
anonymizations. The initial algorithm was referred as “Median Mondrian” and then “Infogain
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Mondrian” and “LSD Mondrian” were also proposed as the extensions, each for specific workload
[43]. For single target classification model, Infogain Mondrian is introduced in which heuristic
partitioning scheme will be based on information gain and at each recursive step, the algorithm
chooses a split which not only satisfies the anonymity criteria but also minimizes the weighted
entropy over the set of resulting partitions. At the end it will produce homogenous partitions of
class labels. For single target regression model, LSD Mondrian is proposed which recursively
chooses the split that minimizes the weighted sum of mean squared errors over the set of resulting
partitions.
Mondrian was also used in employing t-closeness model and its extension, (n,t)-closeness model
[28]. It is also showed that (n,t)-closeness better preserves data utility than basic t-closeness model.
KACA algorithm tries to find an arbitrary equivalence class of size smaller than k and merge it
with the closest equivalence classes to form a larger equivalence class with the smallest distortion.
This process repeats recursively until each equivalent class contains at least k tuples [44].
The use of space mapping techniques in algorithms Hilbert and iDistance enables them to preserve
data utility equally well or even better than the Mondrian algorithm. To map the space of quasiidentifiers, Hilbert algorithm uses the Hilbert curve, which can preserve the locality of points (i.e.,
values in quasi-identifiers) fairly well. The intuition behind using this curve is that, with high
probability, two records with similar values in quasi-identifiers will also be similar with respect to
their rank that is produced based on the curve. The iDistance algorithm measures similarity based
on sampling and clustering of points, and is shown to be slightly inferior to Hilbert in terms of data
utility [45].
Soria-Comas et al. proposed and evaluated microaggregation based algorithms to generate kanonymous t-close data sets. They modified the microaggregation algorithm for it to take tcloseness into account at the moment of cluster formation, in an attempt to improve the utility of
the anonymised data set [14].
-Presence model was employed by two algorithms, SPALM and MPALM. They both took
advantage of anti-monotonicity property of -Presence, which says if a generalized table is not Present, the less generalized table that locates below that table in the generalization lattice is not
-Present either. This leads to pruning search space in top down lattice search. These two
algorithms differ in the way they generalize quasi-identifiers, SPALM does global generalization
while MPALM locally generalizes the values [35]. The extended model, c-Confident -Presence,
uses similar algorithm, SFALM which is modified version of SPALM that accepts a confidence
threshold and a public distribution instead of a public table [36].
Slicing is a new algorithm that addresses many issues at the same time. It addressed the limitation
of generalization, such as high information loss, losing the correlation between quasi-identifiers,
and curse of dimensionality. Therefore, it uses bucketization to prevent facing these drawbacks.
However, it also pointed some limitations for bucketization as well, like not preventing
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membership disclosure and losing the correlation between quasi-identifiers and sensitive attribute.
Therefore, Slicing modified the bucketization approach by merging highly correlated attributes
into columns and then apply bucketization on those columns. In this way, it is showing that the
data utility is highly preserved and also membership disclosure is also prevented [40]. This
approach is also extended to “Overlapping Slicing” which allows creating overlapping columns
that have some attributes in common. This extension came for enhancing the data utility by
preserving more correlations [46].

2.3 Disclosure Risk Measures
Thus far, we have reviewed privacy models introduced in the literature as well as privacy
techniques proposed to satisfy the privacy requirements of the models. Privacy requirements
specified by privacy models are parametric. The parameters express the privacy level and they can
be tuned to preserve privacy of the individuals in a confidential data, up to a desired level. As we
have discussed, the more we preserve individual’s privacy, the more we lose data utility. Privacy
models are compared one to another with respect to the information loss they incur.
Torra stated that privacy models can be seen as Boolean condition for disclosure [12]. It means
the privacy requirement is like a Boolean condition for disclosure; when a confidential data
satisfies the requirement, it implies that there is no disclosure risk. Therefore, in the literature, the
works proposing privacy models do not measure disclosure risk after applying the model on the
dataset.
However, in the literature, some disclosure risk measures have been introduced to evaluate privacy
techniques that are not counted as Boolean condition for disclosure. Besides privacy models, in
the literature, there is an area named Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC), in which various
techniques have been proposed to modify confidential microdata in order to limit disclosure. After
applying these techniques to a confidential microdata and create a privacy protected dataset, they
are evaluated based on a disclosure risk measure calculated on the protected dataset. Several
statistical disclosure control techniques are such as sampling, adding noise, rounding, data
swapping, etc.
Disclosure risk measures introduced in the literature are classified based on the type of disclosure:
identity disclosure or attribute disclosure. Most works have focused on identity disclosure risk
while some considered attribute disclosure risk.

2.3.1 Identity Disclosure Risk Measures
For measuring identity disclosure risk, we need to specify key attributes of the dataset. Key
attributes are the same as quasi-identifiers; they are attributes which incur identity disclosure
because they might be known for individuals from public data sources.
There are two types of identity disclosure risk measures; Uniqueness and Re-identification.
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Uniqueness
This measure is less common than Re-identification measure because it is only used when the
statistical disclosure control technique is sampling. Sampling is one of the SDC techniques which
reduces disclosure risk by selecting only a subset of records from the initial microdata. The original
confidential dataset is the population dataset and the privacy protected dataset is the sample
dataset. Based on Uniqueness measure, identity disclosure risk is defined as the probability that
the rare combination of key attribute values in the sample dataset is indeed rare in the population
dataset.
Re-identification
In this type of risk measure, we assume an adversary has access to an external dataset containing
direct identifiers and some quasi-identifiers for individuals. Having this external knowledge, the
adversary wants to link the victim’s quasi-identifiers to quasi-identifiers in the protected dataset in
order to find a matched record and disclose the confidential information of the victim from the
protected dataset. Thus, re-identification occurs when an adversary could identify a victim’s record
in the protected dataset by matching it with his external knowledge based on the key attribute
values. Consequently, this type of risk measure, estimates the number of re-identifications that an
adversary can obtain.
Re-identification is done through record linkage algorithms which are either probabilistic-based
or distance-based.
Probabilistic-based record linkage algorithms assign weights to each pair of records in the original
and protected dataset, indicating the likelihood that the two records referring to the same
individual. Then, pairs with weights higher than a specified threshold are labeled as “linked”.
Finally, disclosure risk measure is the percentage of records in the privacy protected dataset which
are labeled as “linked”.
Distance-based record linkage algorithms compute distances between records in the original
dataset and the protected dataset. For every record in the protected dataset, the nearest record in
original dataset is marked as “linked”. Disclosure risk measure is then defined as the percentage
of records marked as “linked” in the protected dataset. This type of algorithms are computeintensive and thus might not be applicable for large datasets.
One limitation of re-identification risk measure is that making assumptions about an adversary’s
exact external knowledge is a difficult task and a data publisher cannot perfectly model adversary’s
background knowledge. Domingo-Ferrer addressed this issue and proposed a “maximum
knowledge attacker model” [9]. This model assumes that the adversary has access to the maximum
information about individuals and therefore considers the worst-case scenario for disclosure. The
maximum information about individuals that an adversary can access and incur the maximum
disclosure risk, is the original confidential dataset itself. In fact, this model, assumes that the
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adversary knows all the original key attribute values of the individuals in the confidential dataset,
and use this information for applying re-identification and measuring disclosure risk.

2.3.2 Attribute Disclosure Risk Measures
Attribute disclosure risk measures are less studied in the literature compared to identity disclosure
risk measures, because the privacy models used, such as l-diversity or t-closeness are not
measurable in terms of disclosure risk; they are just Boolean conditions.
Nin et al. proposed an attribute disclosure risk measure for categorical sensitive attributes [10].
Their proposed approach is to build a classifier and use privacy protected dataset as the training
dataset to predict the sensitive attribute value. Then the original confidential dataset is used as a
testing dataset. Finally, the percentage of original records that are correctly classified will be
considered as an estimation of the attribute disclosure risk. In other words, the accuracy of the
classifier would be the measure of attribute disclosure risk.
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3

FLEXIBLE ADVERSARY DISCLOSURE RISK (FADR) MEASURE

In this chapter, we develop a generalized privacy disclosure risk measure, called FADR (Flexible
Adversary Disclosure Risk) measure, at record level, which considers both identity and attribute
disclosure attack concurrently. We define FADR measure as the product of likelihood and
consequence estimators. The likelihood of a record shows how probable the record is to be reidentified by any adversary. The consequence is then measured in terms of the sensitivity level of
the information to be revealed for the record after re-identification. Thus, likelihood is a measure
of identity disclosure and consequence represents attribute disclosure.
FADR measure considers all possible scenarios for an adversary’s external knowledge and
disclosure target by counting any subsets of attributes to be known or unknown by an adversary.
Instead of restricting the adversary’s knowledge to one set of attributes as QIDs, and the
adversary’s disclosure target to one set of attributes as SAs, we iteratively split attributes into two
sets of known and unknown attributes to consider any combination of attributes once to be known
and once to be unknown. The attributes in the known set act as QIDs and the ones in the unknowns
set can be counted as SAs.
Moreover, our approach gives the data publisher the flexibility to assign high weight to attributes
which are more probable to be publicly known about individuals in the underlying dataset as well
as the flexibility to as-sign high weight to attributes which contain more sensitive information
about individuals. This weighting makes known sets containing more probable attributes and
unknown sets comprising more sensitive attributes, have higher impact on FADR measure.
To handle computation complexity, we proposed an efficient algorithm to prune the branches of
known and unknown sets that have low contribution in FADR measure.
In summary, our contributions in this chapter include:





Presenting FADR measure as a single combined metric of disclosure risk, which
measures both identity and attribute disclosure concurrently.
Considering all possible scenarios for an adversary’s external knowledge and disclosure
targets by iteratively splitting attributes into two sets of known and unknown sets.
Providing the flexibility to data publisher for weighing high probable or sensitive
attributes to have higher impact on FADR measure.
Handling the computation complexity of FADR measure including large number of
known and unknown sets, by proposing a pruning algorithm that removes sets with low
contribution in risk calculation.
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3.1 FADR Measure
FADR measure is defined based on risk assessment methodology. In risk assessment, risk contains
two components multiplied with each other-i.e., likelihood and consequence. FADR measure is
defined likewise for each record r in the dataset.

3.1.1 Single Combined Metric for Measuring Identity & Attribute Disclosure
In FADR measure, we use likelihood as a measure of identity disclosure and consequence for
measuring at-tribute disclosure. Thus, FADR, as a single combined disclosure risk measure, is
defined as:
𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) = 𝐿(𝑟) × 𝐶(𝑟),

(3)

where 𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) is the disclosure risk, 𝐿(𝑟) likelihood, and 𝐶(𝑟) the consequence of a record r,
respectively. 𝐿(𝑟) indicates the likelihood of record r to be re-identified by an adversary. 𝐶(𝑟)
specifies that given r is re-identified, what is the sensitivity of the private information of r being
revealed?

3.1.2 Considering All Possible Scenarios for an Adversary’s External Knowledge and
Disclosure Targets
FADR measure considers all possible scenarios for an adversary’s external knowledge and
disclosure target by counting any subset of attributes to be known or unknown by an adversary.
We iteratively split attributes into known and unknown attribute sets. A known set contains
attributes, which an adversary knows about a victim (QIDs). The remaining attributes form the
unknown set and are attributes, which may contain private information (SAs) an adversary wants
to disclose about a victim. The unknown set is a complement set of the known set. We consider
all possible attributes’ splitting. Thus, we allow an attribute to appear in a known set of a split and
in an unknown set of another split. Therefore, we count all possible scenarios for an adversary’s
external knowledge (known set) and disclosure targets (unknown set). Since each attribute has 2
possibilities − i.e., being in the known set or in the unknown set – given m number of attributes,
the total number of known/unknown sets is equal to 2𝑚 . This number includes two cases of having
all attributes as a known set (empty unknown set) and all attributes as an unknown set (empty
known set). The two cases incur no disclosure since there is no disclosure target in the former case
and no external knowledge to be used to find victims in the latter case. Excluding the two cases
from all possible scenarios, FADR measure, defined in Eq. (3), is then calculated over all 2𝑚 − 2
sets, and is extended as:
2𝑚 −2

𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) = ∑ 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) × 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) ,

(4)

𝑖=1
𝑡ℎ

where 𝐾𝑆𝑖 is the 𝑖 known set of attributes and 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 is the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ unknown set of attributes. 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
is the complement set of 𝐾𝑆𝑖 . Likelihood is calculated based on the known set and consequence
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is derived from the unknown set. Thus, 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) is the likelihood of the record r being re-identified
through attributes in the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ known set, and 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) is the consequence of the record r being reidentified in terms of the amount of private information in the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ unknown set being disclosed for
this record.

3.1.3 Weighting Highly Probable Known Sets
As described in Section 3.1.2, FADR measure provides the opportunity for any subset of attributes
to be known by an adversary, which results in counting 2𝑚 − 2 number of known sets. Although
an adversary with any external knowledge may exist, in practice, some subsets of attributes are
more probable to be publicly known than others. Therefore, in our approach, we give the data
publisher the flexibility to assign probability to each attribute, indicating how probable the attribute
is to be publicly known about individuals in the underlying dataset. To make our pruning algorithm
(present in section 3.2) tractable and for the ease of use by users of our measure, it is assumed that
publicly known probability of each attribute is independent from one another. Thus, publicly
known probability of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ known set, shown is Eq. (5), is computed as the multiplication of the
publicly known probabilities of the attributes in the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ known set and the publicly unknown
probabilities (compliment probability) of the attributes which are not in the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ known set, i.e.,
they exist in the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ unknown set. In our terminology, publicly known and unknown probability
are noted as 𝑃𝐾 and 𝑃𝑈𝐾, respectively.
𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) = ∏ 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑗 ) ×
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝐾𝑆𝑖

∏

𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘 )

(5)

𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖

𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑗 ) is the publicly known probability of 𝐴𝑗 , 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘 ) is the publicly unknown probability of
𝐴𝑘 , 𝐴𝑗 is the 𝑗 𝑡ℎ attribute in the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ known set (𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) and 𝐴𝑘 is the 𝑘 𝑡ℎ attribute in the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ unknown
set (𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 ). 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘 ) is the complement probability of 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑘 ), and thereby computed as:
𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘 ) = 1 − 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑘 ).

(6)

We use 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) in calculating 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟). However, 𝐾𝑆𝑖 can be very likely to be publicly known
while 𝐾𝑆𝑖 ’s attribute values for the record 𝑟 might occur frequently in the dataset. Thus, an
adversary will find several matched records for 𝑟 and consequently the likelihood of identity
disclosure for 𝑟 is decreased. Therefore, we also need to consider the frequency of 𝐾𝑆𝑖 ’s attribute
values for the record 𝑟, in formulating likelihood in FADR measure. Hence, 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) is derived as
𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) = 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) × 1⁄𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖 ]) ,

(7)

where 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) is the publicly known probability of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ known set derived from Eq. (5), 𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖 ]
is 𝑖 𝑡ℎ known set’s attribute values for the record 𝑟, and 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖 ] ) is the number of
occurrences of 𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖 ] in the dataset.
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Known sets comprised of attributes with higher values of 𝑃𝐾 increase the first term in Eq. (7), and
therefore lead to higher likelihood of identity disclosure, compared to other known sets containing
attributes with lower values of 𝑃𝐾. This makes highly probable known sets have higher impact on
FADR measure compared to low probable known sets, since FADR measure is calculated over all
possible known sets. The data publisher has the flexibility to apply this impact on FADR measure
by assigning 𝑃𝐾 to each attribute.
The second term in Eq. (7) considers the values of the known set of attributes for the record 𝑟.
Then it counts the number of occurrences of those values together in the whole dataset. If this
count is large, it means a large number of records have these values and the person whom record
𝑟 belongs to is less likely to be re-identified by those attributes. Therefore, the count is inversely
correlated with the likelihood. Including this term, likelihood is no longer a probability function.
However, for each record it is still a value between 0 and 1.
One of the well-known re-identification risks used in the literature is prosecutor risk [47, 48]. This
only measures identity disclosure, by considering specific attributes as QIDs. For a record 𝑟, based
on a specific attributes as QIDs, prosecutor risk is measured as the inverse frequency of QIDvalues of the record 𝑟 in the dataset, as shown in Eq. (8).
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝐼𝐷 (𝑟) = 1⁄𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[QID])

(8)

Theorem 1. 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝐼𝐷 (𝑟), if the attributes in 𝐾𝑆𝑖 are QID attributes and
∀𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝐾𝑆𝑖 : 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑗 ) = 1 and ∀𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 : 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑘 ) = 0.
Proof. Based on Eq. (6), ∀𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 : 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘 ) = 1 − 0 = 1. Therefore, 𝑃𝐾 of known attributes
and 𝑃𝑈𝐾 of unknown attributes are 1. Thus, following Eq. (5), 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) = 1. Substituting in
likelihood formula shown in Eq. (7), likelihood of record 𝑟 based on 𝐾𝑆𝑖 is simplified to
1⁄𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖 ]). Since we assumed 𝐾𝑆𝑖 contains QID attributes, 𝐾𝑆𝑖 = 𝑄𝐼𝐷 and thereby
𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) = 1⁄𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[QID]) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝐼𝐷 (𝑟).

3.1.4 Weighting Sensitive Unknown Sets
The consequence term in FADR measure considers attribute disclosure attack. After finding how
likely the record r is to be identified, we measure how much private information of record r is
revealed. Referring to section 3.1.2, any subset of attributes can be appeared in an unknown set to
consider all possible scenarios for an adversary’s disclosure target. However, attributes can be of
different levels of sensitivity, depending on how much private information they hold and how
much individuals are sensitive about those information.
For example, attribute disease is more sensitive than attribute occupation - people are typically
stricter in keeping their disease information personal and private compared to their occupation
information. Even within an attribute, some values can be more sensitive than the others. For
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instance, within the values of attribute disease, cancer is of the higher severity level compared to
flu, and thus likely to be of higher privacy concern.
Considering different sensitivity levels provides better modeling of attribute disclosure attack.
Thus, in our approach, we give data publisher the flexibility to assign sensitivity weights to both
attributes and their values in the underlying dataset. The attribute sensitivity weights must be
integer values between 0 and 100, and the value sensitivity weights must be integer values between
0 and 1. The larger values imply higher sensitivity and incur higher consequence values in our risk
measure.
Having sensitivity weights assigned for attributes and their values, we define 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) as:
𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 (𝑟) =

∑ ( 𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗 ) × S𝑊(𝑟[𝐴𝑗 ])) ,

(9)

𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖

where 𝑟[𝐴𝑗 ] is the value of 𝐴𝑗 for record 𝑟, 𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗 ) is the sensitivity weight of 𝐴𝑗 , and 𝑆𝑊(𝑟[𝐴𝑗 ] )
is the sensitivity weight of 𝑟[𝐴𝑗 ], the value of 𝐴𝑗 in record r.
Equation (9) indicates that the consequence of a record 𝑟 based on the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ unknown set depends
on sensitivity weights of the attributes in the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ unknown set and the sensitivity weights of 𝑖 𝑡ℎ
unknown set’s attribute values of the record 𝑟. Unknown sets comprising high sensitive attributes
incur high consequence values for the records having high sensitive attribute values as well.
Therefore, they have higher impact on FADR measure, compared to lower sensitive unknown sets.
Hence, data publisher has the flexibility to make influence on FADR measure by assigning
sensitivity weights to attributes and their values.

3.1.5 FADR Bound and Normalization
In this section, we want to measure the maximum and minimum risk of disclosure that can happen
for a victim in any dataset with specific size and attributes, based on our FADR measure. Such
bound is defined according to the specified publicly known probabilities and sensitivity weights
for the attributes. Having such parameters set, FADR measure maximizes when the known tuple
of the victim appears only once in a dataset and the corresponding unknown tuple disclosed has
the maximum sensitivity weight of 1. Therefore, the maximum FADR is formulated as,
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 = ∑(𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) × 1 ×
𝑖

∑ ( S𝑊(𝐴𝑗 ) × 1))

(10)

𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖

The minimum FADR value for a victim depends on the same parameters as well as the size of
confidential dataset. FADR measure minimizes when the known tuple of the victim appears in all
the records of the dataset and the corresponding unknown tuples disclosed have negligible
sensitivity weights. Since such weights are between 0 and 1, we can consider 0.001 as a trivial
value.
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𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 = ∑(𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) ×
𝑖

1
×
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡

∑ ( S𝑊(𝐴𝑗 ) × 0.001))

(11)

𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖

With FADR bound being specified with the assigned parameters, we can normalize the derived
FADR values of the records in a dataset, as shown in Eq. (12), to be between 0 and 1.
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) = (𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅)⁄(𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅)

(12)

3.1.6 An Illustrative Example
In this section, we give an example of calculating likelihood and consequence of a known and
unknown set of a record in the sample microdata, shown in Table 2. Since there are 5 attributes in
the sample microdata, and each attribute can be appeared in the known set and unknown set, totally
there are 25 − 2 = 30 known and unknown sets of attributes. For example, {age, gender, race}
can be a known set and {income, disease} would be the complement unknown set. Another known
set can be {age, gender, race, income} with {disease} as the complement unknown set.
We assigned probabilities and sensitivity weights as shown in Table 3. In practice, the data
publisher has the flexibility to set these values based on the underlying dataset. For instance,
according to our assigned values in Table 3, we consider attribute gender to be 80% probable to
be publicly known, whereas disease is set to be 0.1% probable to be publicly known for the
members of this dataset. Therefore, a known set containing gender will lead to higher likelihood
and thereby more contribution in risk measure, compared to a known set including disease. As
another example, we set attribute sensitivity weight of 90 for income and 0 for race. This incurs a
higher consequence value and thereby has more impact on FADR measure for an unknown set
containing income than for one having race. In addition, records having income values less than
40K or more than 70K, are set to have higher value sensitivity weights than records in the middleincome levels, and thereby higher consequence value for an unknown set containing income. Value
sensitivity weights for age, gender, and race are not defined in Table 3 because in computing
consequence derived from Eq. (9), value sensitivity weights will be multiplied with attribute
sensitivity weights that are 0 for these attributes.
Table 2. Sample microdata
Age

Gender

Race

Income

Disease

𝒓𝟏

34

Male

Black

60K

Flu

𝒓𝟐

19

Female

White

36K

Flu

𝒓𝟑

40

Male

Asian-Pac-Islander

45K

Flu

𝒓𝟒

34

Male

Black

50K

Cancer

𝒓𝟓

51

Female

Black

65K

Flu
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Table 3. Probabilities and sensitivity weights for sample microdata

Attribute

Publicly

Attribute

Value

Known

Sensitivity

Sensitivity

Probability

Weight

Weight
Values

Weight

Age

0.3

0

-----

Gender

0.8

0

-----

Race

0.6

0

-----

Income

0.005

90

Disease

0.001

100

<40K or >70K

1

[40K-70K]

0.7

Flu

0.2

Cancer

1

Based on Eq. (10) and Eq. (11), the maximum and minimum FADR value for a victim’s record
incurred by any confidential dataset with the same size (n=5) and attributes (age, gender, race,
income, and disease) as the sample microdata in Table 2, along with the assigned publicly known
probabilities and attribute sensitivity weights shown in Table 3, are calculated below.
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𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 = ∑(𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) ×

∑

𝑖=1

𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗 )) = 178.87

𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
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1
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 = ∑(𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) × ×
5
𝑖=1

∑ (𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗 ) × 0.001)) = 0.035
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖

Likelihood and consequence for 𝑟4 in the sample microdata, based on the known set {age, gender,
race} and the unknown set {income, disease}, are derived as:
𝐿{𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟,𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒} (𝑟4 ) = (0.3 × 0.8 × 0.6 × (1 − 0.005) × (1 − 0.001) ) × (1⁄2) = 0.071
𝐶{𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒} (𝑟4 ) = (90 × 0.7) + (100 × 1) = 163

3.2 Calculation Efficiency
FADR measure, shown in Eq. (4), is calculated over all possible known/unknown sets of attributes
– i.e., 2𝑚 − 2 number of sets where m is the number of attributes in the dataset. Calculating FADR
measure can be computationally expensive in datasets with large number of attributes, due to the
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exponential growth in the number of known/unknown sets. To make FADR measure
computationally feasible, we reduce the number of known/unknown sets by pruning the branches
of sets having very low contribution in the risk measure. We propose a pruning algorithm, which
removes known/unknown sets of attributes, which have very low value of the product of likelihood
and consequence.
As shown in Eq. (7), the second term of likelihood depends on the record values and value
sensitivity weights in Eq. (9) make consequence values different for different records. Our pruning
algorithm should prune the known/unknown sets, which result in very low disclosure risk
contribution for any record. Therefore, we assume the worst record, which incurs the highest
likelihood and consequence for any known/unknown set. We prune known/unknown sets incurring
very low product of likelihood and consequence for the worst record and thereby the pruned
known/unknown sets would have very low product of likelihood and consequence for any other
records. The worst record has the maximum value of the second term of likelihood and sensitivity
weight, which both are the value 1. Hence, the worst record disclosure risk measure will be
simplified as
𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅𝐾𝑆𝑖 /𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 = 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) ×

∑

𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗 ),

(13)

𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖

and our pruning algorithm prunes branches of known/unknown sets having 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 value of
less than a threshold 𝜀.
Since 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) is based on the product of probabilities, it follows that if one probability is less
than a value, any probability multiplied with that will result in a smaller value. Therefore, we
construct a tree of attributes, order by their publicly known and unknown probabilities. Each node
is either a known or an unknown attribute and represents the subset of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ known and unknown
set made from the node’s attribute and all the attributes in the ancestors. The height of this tree is
equal to the number of attributes (𝑚). Therefore, each leaf node represents the complete 𝑖 𝑡ℎ
known/unknown set and 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) is derived at each leaf node by multiplying probabilities of the
leaf and its ancestors. Traversing tree from the root to the leaves, attribute probabilities (𝑃𝐾 and
𝑃𝑈𝐾) are monotonically decreasing. Our algorithm calculates the partial 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) at each node
by multiplying the node’s probability with the probabilities of the ancestors. If the partial 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 )
is less than a value, all the complete known/unknown sets represented in the leaves of the subtree
at this node will have publicly known probabilities of a smaller value.
Our algorithm also needs to check the second term in (13), which represents the consequence.
However, this term is not monotonically decreasing in the constructed tree. Therefore, at each
node, by looking at the attributes in the descendants, we find the complete unknown set with the
maximum consequence value, which is the sum of unknown attribute sensitivity weights.
Accordingly, traversing from the root to the leaves of the tree, the maximum consequence value
either remains the same or decreases. Thus, at each node, we multiply the partial 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖 ) with
the maximum consequence value, and if it gets lower than a threshold 𝜀, all the complete
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known/unknown sets represented in the leaves of the subtree at the node, will have the value for
this product lower than 𝜀 as well. Hence, our algorithm prunes the subtree at a node having this
product lower than 𝜀.

Table 4. Sorted list of all probabilities for the sample microdata
𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟓 ) 𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟒 ) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟐 ) 𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟏 ) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟑 ) 𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟑 ) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟏 ) 𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟐 ) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟒 ) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟓 )

99.9%

99.5%

80%

70%

60%

40%

30%

20%

0.5%

0.1%

Figure 4. Part of the constructed tree for the sample microdata

For instance, back to the sample microdata in Table 2, and the assigned probabilities shown in
Table 3, first we create a sorted list of all known and unknown probabilities, shown in Table 4.
Then, we construct a tree accordingly. A part of a constructed tree is demonstrated in Figure 4 with
attribute indices written in the nodes. In the tree, the attributes with the prime sign are classified
into unknown set and the attributes without prime sign are classified into the known set. For
example, the leftmost leaf node represents {𝐴2 , 𝐴3 } as the known set and {𝐴1 , 𝐴4 , 𝐴5 } as the
unknown set.
Figure 5 shows an example of the way we prune a branch of the tree. This figure just shows a
sample branch and does not show the subtree at the node. The publicly known probability of each
subset is written next to each node, on the left column. The maximum consequence at each node
is shown next to each node on the right column. At the node {5′ }, a complete unknown set having
the maximum consequence is the one with 𝐴5 and 𝐴4 as the unknown attributes, which results in
100+90 consequence value. However, at the node {3}, since the tree is in the order of probabilities,
we don’t have 𝐴4 as the unknown attribute in the subtree and instead we have 𝐴4 as the known
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attribute. That is why the maximum consequence at this node is 100, which is just for having 𝐴5
as the only unknown attribute. Consider the pruning threshold 𝜀 to be 2%. By moving towards the
leaf and calculating the probabilities times maximum consequence, we can see that the probability
of {3, 1, 4} known set and {5, 2} unknown set becomes 0.00017 and the maximum consequence
value is 100. Therefore, 0.00017  100 equals to 0.017 which is less than 0.2 and therefore the tree
is pruned from that node.

Figure 5. The pruning process example

Algorithm 1 shows our proposed pruning algorithm for removing known/unknown sets having low
contribution in the risk measure. The inputs of our algorithm are the list of attributes in the dataset
and the assigned publicly known probability and sensitivity weight for each attribute. The output
is the list of known/unknown sets remained after pruning. Having publicly known probabilities of
the attributes, we calculate publicly unknown probabilities based on (6). Then, we sort all the
attributes, to both be known and unknown, in descending order of their probabilities, and write
them in the variable 𝑆 (line 2). For example, looking at the Table 4, 𝑆 would be {5′ , 4′ , 2, 1′ , 3,
3′ , 1, 2′ , 4, 5} (showing attribute indices only). Each attribute appears twice in this list, one to be
known and one to be unknown (with prime sign). Therefore the length of 𝑆 is 2𝑚. 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆
contains subsets of known and unknown attributes with the 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 value of (13) more than 𝜀.
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 is initiated by an empty subset. 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 contains subsets of attributes; each
corresponds to one subset in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆, showing a set of remaining attributes that can be appended
to the subset in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 for enlarging the subset. 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 is initiated by all attributes as the
candidates to be appended to the empty set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆, which is 𝑆. 𝑖 is a pointer sweeping
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 and 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 to point to the current subset and select it for checking whether it needs
to be enlarged or pruned. 𝑖 is initiated by 0 and line 5 of the algorithm shows that the first subset
to select is the last set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆. Pointer starts from the last set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 and sweeps
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towards the first set. Whenever a new subset is appended to the 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆, the pointer is reset to
0 to restart sweeping from the last set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆.
After a subset is selected (line 5), its remaining attributes, selected from the corresponding set in
𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 6), should be appended one by one to the selected subset and create a partial set
to check (line 8). Each time the publicly known probability of the partial set (line 11) and the sum
of sensitivity weights of the partial set and the next unknown attributes (line 14) are calculated,
and the product of these two terms, based on (8), will be 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅. We checked the value of
𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 (line 16). If it is more than 𝜀:









The partial set is appended to 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 17).
The set of remaining attributes for the partial set need to be appended to 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆
(line 18). The remaining attributes must not contain a known/an unknown attribute,
which already exists as an unknown/a known in the partial set (line 12 and 13).
If the length of the partial set is equal to the number of attributes, it implies that it is a
complete known/unknown set and we have reached the leaf node of the tree. So, the
algorithm outputs the set (line 19). Then, 𝑖 is incremented by one (line 29) to select the
prior subset in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 5) and its corresponding remaining attributes in
𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 6) to process. If the length of the partial set is not equal to the number
of attributes, we need to continue enlarging the partial set when there are still attributes
remained for enlarging (line 7). Since the partial set was added to the end of 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆, 𝑖
is reset to 0 to start sweeping 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 and 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 from the end.
else:
The partial set is not appended to the SUBSETS and not selected for enlarging.
Therefore, the partial set is pruned and consequently all the known/unknown sets
comprising this partial set are pruned.
Then the algorithm continues with the subset selected earlier in line 5, and appends the
next attribute to create a new partial set (line 8), if any attribute remained (line 7).

Whenever no more attributes remained for the selected subset (line 28), 𝑖 is incremented by one
(line 29) to select the prior subset in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 and its corresponding remaining attributes in
𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 5 and 6) and again these attributes are appended one by one and each time the
𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 is checked. This loop continues until no more subset is remained in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 which
its remaining attributes are not appended and their 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 value are not checked (line 4).
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Algorithm 1. Pruning Low Risk Sets
Input:
Attributes {𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , …, 𝐴𝑚 }; Publicly Known Probability of Attributes {𝑃𝐾(𝐴1 ), 𝑃𝐾(𝐴2 ), … ,
𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑚 )}; Sensitivity Weight of Attributes {𝑆𝑊(𝐴1 ), 𝑆𝑊(𝐴2 ), … , 𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑚 )}; Pruning threshold 𝜀;
Output:
Remaining known/unknown sets after pruning;
Algorithm:
1: {𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴1 ), 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴2 ), … , 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑚 )} = {1 − 𝑃𝐾(𝐴1 ), 1 − 𝑃𝐾(𝐴2 ), … , 1 − 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑚 )};
2: 𝑆 = sorted list of attributes to be both known and unknown in descending order of attribute’s 𝑃𝐾
and 𝑃𝑈𝐾;
3: 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 = {{}}; 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 = {{𝑆}}; 𝑖 = 0;
4: while (𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) − 𝑖) ! = 0 do
5:
𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) − 𝑖 );
6:
𝑛𝑥𝑡 = 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) − 𝑖 );
7:
while 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑛𝑥𝑡) ! = 0 do
8:
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 = 𝑠𝑢𝑏 union first attribute in 𝑛𝑥𝑡;
9:
Delete first attribute in 𝑛𝑥𝑡;
10:
𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) − 𝑖 ) = 𝑛𝑥𝑡;
11:
𝑃𝐾_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 = 𝑃𝐾(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡) calculated from (3);
12:
Remove known attributes in 𝑛𝑥𝑡 which exist in 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 as unknown;
13:
Remove unknown attributes in 𝑛𝑥𝑡 which exist in 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 as known;
14:
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞 = sum of sensitivity weights of unknown attributes in 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡
and 𝑛𝑥𝑡;
15:
𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝑃𝐾_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 × 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞
16:
if 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 > 𝜀 then
17:
Append 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 to 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆;
18:
Append 𝑛𝑥𝑡 to 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆;
19:
if 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡) == 𝑚 then
20:
Output 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡
21:
Break;
22:
else
23:
𝑠𝑢𝑏 = last set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆;
24:
𝑛𝑥𝑡 = last set in 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆;
25:
𝑖 = 0;
26:
end if
27:
end if
28:
end while
29:
𝑖++
30: end while

34

3.3 Experiments
In our experiments, we used a sample dataset from the UCI machine learning repository Adult
dataset*, extracted from the 1994 Census database. Our Adult sample dataset contains 9 attributes
of Age, Work class, Education, Marital status, Occupation, Race, Gender, Country, Income, and
30162 records after eliminating missing values.

Table 5. Assigned PKs and SWs for Adult sample dataset

Attribute

Publicly
Known
Probability

Sensitivity
Weight of
Attributes

Age (𝑨𝟏 )

0.3

0

Work class (𝑨𝟐 )

0.1

100

Education (𝑨𝟑 )

Sensitivity Weight of
Attribute Values
Values
all values
without pay
Other than
"without pay”
primary school
Other than
"primary school”

Weight
0
1
0.1
1

0.1

100

0.01

0

all values

0

0.05
0.6
0.8

100
0
0

all values
all values
all values

1
0
0

Country (𝑨𝟖 )

0.2

0

all values

0

Income (𝑨𝟗 )

0.001

100

all values

1

Marital status
(𝑨𝟒 )
Occupation (𝑨𝟓 )
Race (𝑨𝟔 )
Gender (𝑨𝟕 )

0

To calculate FADR measure for our Adult sample dataset, we assigned publicly known
probabilities and sensitivity weights to the attributes as shown in Table 5. We assumed the gender
attribute is the most probable attribute to be publicly known about individuals (80%), followed by
race (60%), age (30%), and country of origin (20%). We considered the occupation and income of
individuals as their most private information, regardless of the values (sensitivity weight of 100
for the attributes and 1 for all the values). Work class and education of the underlying individuals
can be assumed as their sensitive information based on their values. For example, if their work
class is assigned “without pay”, that implies they have no income. In addition, the individuals

*

https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
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underlying our sample dataset are all older than 16 years old. Therefore, if their education is stated
as “primary school” it reveals that they have dropped out of school. As a result, we assigned
sensitivity weight of 1 to “without pay” work class and “primary school” education.
The experiments are conducted on a machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3632QM CPU (2.20
GHz) and 8 GB RAM, programmed with R 3.3.2 software.

3.3.1 Evaluating FADR measure
In this experiment, we evaluate the FADR measure on the Adult sample dataset. We derived the
FADR values for all the records based on Eq. (4). We used the parameter values shown in Table
5 with the pruning threshold (𝜀) of 0.01. The sum of all the records’ FADR value that represents
the whole dataset’s disclosure risk (Total FADR) is derived as 72,917. Besides, we obtained the
normalized FADR value for each record according to Eq. (12). Figure 6 shows the frequency of
the records within each category of normalized FADR values.

Figure 6. Distribution of the normalized FADR values among the records.
We identified a record 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 in our dataset with the maximum FADR value, which is at the highest
risk of disclosure. Such record has the normalized FADR value of 19.16%, and the FADR value
36

of 69.33. Looking at the values of 𝐿𝐾𝑆 (𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥) × 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆 (𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥) for all the known/unknown sets,
we found that the known set {Age, Race, Gender} and the corresponding unknown set {Work class,
Education, Marital status, Occupation, Country, Income} has the highest value of 27.18 among
all other sets, with the contribution of 39% (27.18⁄69.33) in the FADR calculation for this record.
This implies the fact that 39% of the disclosure risk of 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 is incurred by an adversary who
knows the age, ethnicity, and gender of this victim without knowing the rest of information that
are exposed to disclosure. The remaining 61% of FADR value is derived by considering other
possible adversaries with different external knowledge and disclosure targets.
The likelihood value of 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 obtained from the aforementioned known/unknown set is equal to
0.087, which means there is 8.7% of chance for the specified adversary to identify 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 (identity
disclosure). This value is derived from the probability of publicly knowing {Age, Race, Gender}
and not knowing {Work class, Education, Marital status, Occupation, Country, Income} (equals
0.087) multiplied by the inverse frequency of the values of {Age, Race, Gender} for 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 in our
dataset (equals 1). 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 has the known set values of {63, other, male}, which only appears once
in the whole dataset. This is the first reason to make such record at the highest risk of disclosure.
Besides, the consequence value of 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 incurred by the aforementioned unknown set, is equal to
310. This value indicates the level of disclosure that will happen if the victim of 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 is found in
the dataset (attribute disclosure). The unknown set of values for 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 is {Private, Preschool,
Married-civ-spouse, Prof-specialty, Mexico, <=50}, which contains the sensitive attributes of
occupation (SW=100) and income (SW=100) regardless of the values, in addition to the sensitive
attributes of work class (SW=100) and education (SW=100), for which the values are private
(SW=0.1) and preschool (SW=1), respectively. Therefore, the consequence is derived as 100 +
100 + (100×0.1) + (100×1) = 310. The second reason that makes such record at the highest risk of
disclosure is that all the sensitive attributes exist in the unknown set for the specified adversary
and the record has the highest sensitive value for education attribute as well.

3.3.2 Likelihood Measure in FADR vs. Prosecutor Risk Measure
As described in Section 3.1.1, the likelihood term in FADR measure captures identity disclosure
risk. Also, in Section 3.1.3, we mentioned that the prosecutor risk is a well-known identity
disclosure risk measure and in Theorem 1 we proved that the prosecutor risk measure is a
simplified version of the likelihood measure in FADR. However, the prosecutor risk measure
restricts the adversary’s knowledge to a specific set of attributes as QIDs. In Section 3.1.2, we
addressed this limitation by showing that our approach considers all possible external knowledge
for an adversary. The identity disclosure risk value measured by either prosecutor risk or our
likelihood measure in FADR, is between zero and one.
In this experiment, we compared the likelihood measure in FADR, as a measure of identity
disclosure risk, with the prosecutor risk measure, to evaluate the effect of considering all possible
external knowledge for an adversary on the risk values of the records.
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We calculated the prosecutor risk measure for each record in the Adult sample dataset by
considering {age, race, gender} as the QIDs. This would result in the same likelihood measure in
our approach if we assign 𝑃𝐾 of 1 to age, race, and gender attributes, and 0 to other attributes. In
fact, it results in having only one set of known attributes which is {age, race, gender} and one set
of unknown attributes comprising the remaining attributes. However, in our approach, we have the
flexibility in assigning probabilities to consider any combination of attributes to be known and
unknown. Thus, instead of assigning probabilities 1 and 0 to attributes, which restricts an
adversary’s external knowledge and disclosure target to only one known and unknown set, we
changed 𝑃𝐾 of 1 to 0.99 and 𝑃𝐾 of 0 to 0.01, and calculated our likelihood measure in FADR for
all the records.
Table 6. Comparing prosecutor risk with our likelihood measure.
Identity
Disclosure Risk
Measure

Number of
known/unknown
sets

Execution time
(sec)

Average Identity
Disclosure Risk Value

Prosecutor Risk

1

0.28

1%

Likelihood
Measure in FADR

45

3.41

2%

Table 6 shows that changing the probabilities from 1 and 0 to 0.99 and 0.01 respectively, increased
the number of known and unknown sets to 45 and the execution time is increased accordingly.
Considering 45 known and unknown sets doubled the average identity disclosure risk. Therefore,
generalizing the external knowledge and disclosure target of an adversary, incurs higher disclosure
risk.

3.3.3 Evaluating our pruning algorithm
In this experiment, we evaluate the effect of pruning threshold (𝜀) on the total FADR, the number
of known/unknown sets remained after pruning, and the execution time, shown in Table 7.
Figure 7 (a) shows that reducing the pruning threshold increases the number of remaining
known/unknown sets because more sets will have the 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 value of Eq. (13) larger than the
small threshold. Since the number of sets increased, the execution time for calculating FADR
measure will also be increased, as shown in Figure 7 (b), because there are more sets to count in
the measure.
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Table 7. Effect of pruning threshold on FADR, number of remaining sets, and execution time.
Pruning Threshold
(𝜺)

Total FADR

0.0001
0.0005
0.001
0.005
0.01
0.05
0.1
0.2
0.999
5
10
30
60

73,656.23
73,620.73
73,569.47
73,255.3
72,917.68
71,240.02
69,358.27
66,350.64
52,968.05
32,639.34
14,769.63
10,419.69
436.43

Number of
known/unknown
sets
307
250
225
167
148
101
81
67
34
14
7
3
1

Execution time
(sec)
54.08
49.67
40.09
31.28
26.36
18.17
14.69
11.55
6.53
3.25
1.75
1
0.43

Figure 7 (c) shows that large thresholds result in lower total risk because we remove the
known/unknown sets, which have high contribution in FADR measure. However, this figure
shows that at some point (𝜺 = 0.01 in this experiment), reducing the threshold does not change
the total FADR. This proves that at this point, the pruning algorithm is removing the
known/unknown sets with the low contribution in the risk measure. Besides, checking this point
(𝜀 = 0.01) in Figure 7 (a) and (b), we can see that the number of remaining known/unknown sets
and execution time are still less than those of lower thresholds. Thus, it is concluded that the
best pruning threshold to choose would be the one that reaches a total FADR value, which will
no longer be increased by reducing the threshold whereas it results in lower number of remaining
sets and execution time compared to the lower thresholds.

3.3.4 Effect of Publicly Known Probabilities
FADR is calculated based on the set of parameters assigned by the data publisher. One set of
parameters is the publicly known probabilities. In this experiment, we first evaluate the effect of
small changes in publicly known probabilities on the total FADR, and then illustrate how the total
FADR changes if the data publisher assigns different values of probabilities.
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 7. Effect of pruning threshold on (a) sum of records’ FADR values (b) number of
known/unknown sets remained, (c) execution time.

First, we apply small changes to each attribute’s publicly known probability to evaluate the
robustness of FADR measure to small changes in input parameters. Since this parameter is
probability, we consider 1% as a small change, and increased each attribute’s probability shown
in Table 5 by 1%, one at a time, keeping the remaining probabilities and sensitivity weights
constant. For each trial, we applied pruning algorithm with the same threshold of 0.01, and
calculated FADR measure. The results are shown in Table 8. It is indicated that by increasing
probabilities by 1%, the total FADR varies between 72,591.83 and 74,892.77. Figure 8 shows that
the small changes of probabilities does not affect the total FADR value considerably. The highest
change in total FADR occurs when the probability of attribute Age is increased because the age of
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individuals in the dataset has more diversity (74 different ages) and if this information is known
for a victim, fewer candidates can be matched with the same age for the victim, and therefore the
risk of disclosure will be increased.

Table 8. Effect of small changes on publicly known probabilities.
Trials
No changes
𝑷𝑲(𝑨𝒈𝒆)+0.01
𝑷𝑲(𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔)+0.01
𝑷𝑲(𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)+0.01
𝑷𝑲(𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒔)+0.01
𝑷𝑲(𝑶𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)+0.01
𝑷𝑲(𝑹𝒂𝒄𝒆)+0.01
𝑷𝑲(𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓)+0.01
𝑷𝑲(𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚)+0.01
𝑷𝑲(𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆)+0.01

Total FADR
72,917.68
74,892.77
73,661.57
74,656.47
73,803.14
73,632.01
73,332.08
73,191.58
74,186.3
72,591.83

Figure 8. Comparing the total FADR values after applying small changes on probabilities.
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In addition, we evaluated how the total FADR value of our dataset changes if the data publisher
assigns different values of publicly known probabilities to attributes. For this experiment, we chose
Age and Income attributes, as two representatives of insensitive and sensitive attributes,
respectively.
The blue chart in Figure 9 shows that increasing publicly known probability of the Age attribute
from zero to one, monotonically increases the total FADR, from 13,704 to 212,635. Comparing
the trials, it is indicated that 10% increase in knowing the age of underlying individuals leads to
the significant increase in the total FADR. Assigning higher probability to the Age attribute makes
this attribute to be classified in the known set better than the unknown set after pruning. Since Age
is not categorized as a sensitive attribute (SW=0), existing in the unknown set does not increase
the consequence and thereby disclosure risk. Besides, since the underlying individuals have
diverse age values, the frequency values of Age attribute become lower, which increases the
likelihood of sets including Age as the known attribute. As a result, the more the Age attribute
would be publicly known for the underlying individuals, the more disclosure risk occurs.

Figure 9. Comparing the total FADR values after assigning different publicly known
probabilities to Age and Income attributes.

The orange chart in Figure 9 shows the same trials on the attribute Income. It shows the reverse
trend as we increase the publicly known probability compared to the Age attribute. Increasing the
probability from zero to one, monotonically decreases the total FADR from 72,977 to 48,788.
Since the income level of individuals is set to be a sensitive information (SW=100), the more it
appears in the unknown sets, the greater consequence occurs and the higher disclosure risk incurs.
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By increasing the publicly known probability for this attribute, we classify it to more known sets
than unknown sets, after pruning. Therefore, the total FADR is reduced.

3.3.5 Effect of Sensitivity Weights
In this experiment, first, we evaluate the robustness of FADR measure in small changes of the
sensitivity weights. Then, we demonstrate how the total FADR value changes if the data publisher
assigns different values of sensitivity weights.
As shown in Table 5, we initially assigned attribute sensitivity weight of 100 to Work class,
Education, Occupation, and Income attributes, while the rest of attributes are classified as
insensitive (SW=0). In this experiment, we applied small changes to both attribute and value
sensitivity weights of the four sensitive attributes, one at a time, keeping the remaining parameters
constant. Since we defined the attribute sensitivity weights must be between 0 and 100, small
change of 1% requires the attribute sensitivity weights to be changed from 100 to 99 (1 unit
reduction). In addition, we set the value sensitivity weights to be between 0 and 1. Therefore, as a
small change of 1%, we subtracted 0.01 from the value sensitivity weights of the four attributes,
except for the values other than “primary school” for Education, which we added 0.01 because
their initial sensitivity weights were zero and we cannot assign value below zero as a weight.
Table 9. Effect of Small Changes on Sensitivity Weights.
Total
FADR

Trials
No changes

72,917.68

𝑺𝑾(𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔)-1

72,887.44

𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔]) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏

72,617.62

𝑺𝑾(𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)-1

72,903.95

𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏] = 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏
73,147.03
𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏] = 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍) + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏
𝑺𝑾(𝑶𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)-1

72,605.54

𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑶𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏]) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏

72,605.54

𝑺𝑾(𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆)-1

72,544.6

𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆]) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏

72,544.6
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The calculated total FADR values obtained in each trial of applying such small changes are shown
in Table 9. It is illustrated that small changes on the sensitivity weights applied trivial changes on
the total FADR value of our dataset (from 72,544 to 73,147.03), which proves the robustness of
the FADR measure. We can see that the total FADR value remains the same when the sensitivity
weight of Occupation reduced by 1 and the sensitivity weight of their values reduced by 0.01
(equals 72,605.54). The reason is that in the former case, the sensitivity weight for attribute and
all the values are 99 and 1, respectively, and in the latter case, they are 100 and 0.99, respectively.
In both trials, the product of such weights remains the same, and thereby it has the same
contribution in FADR measure, which leads to the same total FADR values. The same reason
applies to the two trails on Income.

Figure 10. Comparing the total FADR values after assigning different sensitivity weights to Race
and Income attributes.
In addition, we demonstrated the changes on the total FADR value when the data publisher assigns
different values of sensitivity weights to attributes and attribute’s values. Figure 12 shows the total
FADR values achieved after assigning different values of attribute sensitivity weight to Race and
Income. In both trials, we assigned value sensitivity weights of 1 to all races and income levels,
and the rest of the parameters remain the same as shown in Table 5. It is illustrated that changing
the sensitivity weight of Income attribute from 0 to 100, incus a larger increase in the total FADR
(from 35,538 to 72,917) compared to the Race attribute (from 72,917 to 82,907). The reason is
that according to Table 5, publicly known probability of Income attribute is much less than the
Race attribute. Therefore, after pruning, Income appears more in the unknown sets than the known
sets while Race exists in more known sets. Thus, Income has higher contribution in the
consequence part of the FADR measure compared to the Race. As a result, sensitivity weight of
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Income is more engaged in the FADR measurement than that of Race, which results in larger
increase in total FADR when we change Income’s attribute sensitivity weight.
Figure 11 illustrates the changes in the total FADR, when data publisher changes the sensitivity
weights assigned to attribute values of Occupation attribute. It is indicated that when we increase
the sensitivity weight of all the values of Occupation from 0 to 1, the total FADR enhanced from
41,704 to 72,917.

Figure 11. Comparing the total FADR values after assigning different sensitivity weights to all
values of Occupation attribute.

3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we developed Flexible Adversary Disclosure Risk (FADR) measure, which
captures both identity and attribute disclosure attacks concurrently. Besides, it models all possible
external knowledge and disclosure targets for an adversary by considering any combination of
attributes to be known and unknwon by an adversary. We proved that the likelihood term in FADR
measure is a generalized form of the prosecutor risk for measuring the identity disclosure risk,
which overcomes the limitation of the prosecutor risk measure in restricting adversary’s external
knowledge. Our approach also provides the flexibility to data publisher to assign publicly known
probabilties and sensitivity weights to attributes to make known sets containing more probable
attributes and unknown sets containnig more sensitive attributes have higher contribution in FADR
calculation. Moreover, we developed a pruning algorithm to remove known/unknown sets having
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very low contribution in the calcultaion of FADR measure, to reduce the computation complexity
of our measure. Finally, through a set of experiments we showed the effectiveness of our pruning
algorithm and the robustness of FADR measure to the small changes on the input parameters.
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4

OPTIMIZING ANONYMIZATION

There is always a trade-off between preserving privacy and data utility, i.e., the more we
anonymize the data to better preserve individual’s privacy, the more information the data loses and
the less data utility it preserves. As described in Chapter 2, various privacy techniques are
developed in the literature to satisfy a privacy model by employing anonymization techniques
through different algorithms based on data utility objectives. Such algorithms aim at both
satisfying a privacy requirement and minimizing information loss. A privacy requirement is a
Boolean condition that defines specific level of privacy preservation on a sensitive dataset.
In this chapter, we aim at developing an anonymization algorithm, which instead of achieving a
predefined privacy level, minimizes the disclosure risk of a dataset, along with the information
loss. Our anonymization algorithm, named “RU Generalization”, is a risk/utility-based
generalization algorithm that utilizes our developed FADR measure, described in Chapter 3, as a
disclosure risk measure, and Loss measure [49, 50] (re-formulated as NCP [50]), as an information
loss metric. We use local recoding generalization as the anonymization operation.

4.1 Data Utility Metric
In RU Generalization algorithm, we need a metric for measuring data utility to optimize
anonymization with respect to preserving the most data utility as well as privacy. We have chosen
Loss as the data utility metric to measure information loss on the generalized dataset. In the
literature, Loss has been demonstrated as an effective measure of information loss on a generalized
dataset, since it considers the generalization level of each value [39]. It defines information loss
based on the magnitude of deviation of the generalized value from the original value, and penalizes
more generalized values. Loss is defined at the attribute level, as shown in Eq. (14, and can be
aggregated at the record (Eq.(15)) and dataset level (Eq. (16)).

𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟[𝐴]

, 𝐴 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐

𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴

𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴 (𝑟) = { 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑟[𝐴] 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴′ 𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 hierarchy
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐴

(14)
, 𝐴 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙

Loss of an attribute’s generalized value is calculated based on Eq. (14. If an attribute is numeric,
Loss is derived by dividing the range of generalized value by the overall range of attribute’s
original values. For example, if the generalized value is [10-20] and the overall range of values is
[0-50], the Loss of the generalized value equals 10/50. If an attribute is categorical, the
generalization hierarchy tree of the attribute is considered, and the Loss is derived by dividing the
number of leaves at the subtree of the generalized value in the generalization hierarchy tree by the
number of distinct original values of the attribute. For instance, Figure 12 shows an example of
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the generalization hierarchy tree for the attribute Employment Type. Loss of the generalized value
Government equals 3/8 because the subtree at the node Government has 3 leaves and the attribute
has 8 total distinct original values. Loss of an attribute is a value between 0 and 1. Loss of 1 for an
attribute means the attribute value is suppressed.

Figure 12. Generalization hierarchy tree for the attribute "Employment Type"

Once the Loss for the attributes are calculated, the Loss of a record is derived by the weighted sum
of Loss of the record’s attributes, as shown in Eq.(15), and is called the record’s weighted Loss.

𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑟) =

∑𝑖 𝑈𝑊𝑖 × 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑖 (𝑟)
∑𝑖 𝑈𝑊𝑖

(15)

Based on the domain area of the data use, different attributes can be at different levels of
importance for the purpose of study. Some attributes might be of more importance for the use of
users and therefore the users prefer to have the original values of such attributes. Therefore, the
Loss of such attributes needs to be weighted over other attributes with lower importance, in
aggregating the Loss for a record. The importance weight of each attribute is denoted as UW
(Utility Weight) in Eq.(15).

𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝐷′ ) = ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑟)

(16)

𝑛

Finally, the Loss of the generalized dataset is the sum of all the records’ weighted Loss, as shown
in Eq. (16), and implies the total information loss of the generalized dataset 𝐷′ .
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4.2 RU Generalization Algorithm
Our developed RU Generalization algorithm is a greedy heuristic algorithm to obtain an optimum
generalized dataset with the minimum disclosure risk and information loss, shown in Algorithm
2. At each iteration, our greedy algorithm targets a record with maximum disclosure risk and the
corresponding set of attributes contributing the most in the risk measure. Then, it aims at
generalizing such attributes by grouping with tuples that incurs the lowest information loss. After
applying the generalization at each iteration, the FADR measure needs to be calculated to indicate
the reduction in risk and identify the new record at the highest disclosure risk for the next iteration.
FADR calculation requires the updated frequency counts on all the known sets of attributes. Since
the data is generalized, such frequency counts are not merely capturing the exact matches. They
also count the tuples that are within the generalized value. Therefore, recalculating the FADR
measure at each iteration is computationally expensive. Thus, our heuristic algorithm estimates the
FADR measure, at each iteration, by only updating frequency counts of the known sets
contributing the most in FADR calculation of the records. Besides, the known sets that have tuples
with high frequency counts are not updated, since increasing the large frequencies have small
impact on the FADR reduction.
The inputs of RU Generalization algorithm include original dataset with 𝑛 records (D), list of all
known sets (KS), publicly known probabilities for all known/unknown sets (PK), likelihood and
consequence of all records in the dataset for all known/unknown sets (L and C, respectively),
FADR values for all the records on the original dataset (R), the list of generalization hierarchy
trees for all categorical attributes in the dataset (GH), utility weights of attributes (UW), and the
user defined maximum information loss (MaxTotalLoss). This algorithm outputs a generalized
dataset that is optimum in terms of incurring the minimum summation of disclosure risk and
information loss.
Our RU Generalization algorithm starts with initializing some variables (Algorithm 2, line 1-7).
This algorithm applies generalization to the dataset at each iteration, and saves the generalized
dataset as 𝐷′ , which is initially equal to the original dataset. 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the total risk on the
original dataset, which is the maximum total risk compared to the total risk of the generalized
versions of the dataset, and is used to normalize total estimated risk. At each iteration, we estimate
the records’ disclosure risk. Therefore, we define the parameter 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 for saving the estimated
FADR values for all the records, and initialize it to the original risk values. The total risk of the
original dataset is the highest value compared to the total estimated risk values derived after
generalizing the dataset. We normalize the total risk value to be between 0 and 1. Therefore, the
initial total risk would be 1. The initial total Loss is 0, since we start with the original dataset with
no information loss. 𝐷𝐾𝑆 contains subsets of the original dataset for each set of known set
attributes. 𝐹𝑇 is a matrix with rows for each record and columns for each known set and contains
the frequency of known set tuples of records in the original dataset. Since our algorithm iteratively
searches for the matches of known set tuples in the dataset, we create an index structure to store
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the unique known set tuples for each known set as the search keys with the indices of matching
records in the original dataset as the reference (Algorithm 2, line 5). This index table initially
consists of the original tuples, and will be updated to contain generalized tuples with the indices
for the matching original records at each iteration of generalization (Algorithm 5, line 22). The
defined objective function is the summation of the data’s total risk and total information loss
(Algorithm 2, line 6).
Our optimization algorithm aims at minimizing our objective function. We iteratively generalize
the dataset (Algorithm 2, line 8-29) and calculate the total estimated risk (Algorithm 2, line 17)
and information loss (Algorithm 2, line 19) of the generalized dataset at each iteration and derive
the objective function and append it to the previous ones (Algorithm 2, line 20).
At each iteration, we find the minimum of the objective function (Algorithm 2, line 21) and
compare it to the global minimum obtained from the previous iterations (Algorithm 2, line 22). If
the minimum value obtained in the current iteration is less than the global minimum from the
previous iterations, it implies that the generalized dataset created in the current iteration has lower
disclosure risk and information loss compared to the previous ones. Therefore, we save that as the
optimum generalized dataset obtained so far (Algorithm 2, line 23), and update the global
minimum point with the minimum value obtained in the current iteration (Algorithm 2, line 24).
Our algorithm continues until we know that the objective function will not go below the global
minimum. As we further generalize the dataset, the total information loss always increases while
the total risk decreases monotonically. Thus, if the total information loss gets larger than the global
minimum of the objective function, it is concluded that, by further generalizing the dataset, our
objective function will not go below the global minimum. As a result, our algorithm continues as
long as the total information loss is less than or equal to the global minimum value of the objective
function (Algorithm 2, line 8). When the total information loss gets larger than the global minimum
value (Algorithm 2, line 26), the algorithm will not execute the next iteration and the generalized
dataset which was obtained at the point of global minimum of the objective function is returned as
the optimum generalized dataset (Algorithm 2, line 27).
At each iteration of our algorithm, we find a record in the dataset with the highest estimated risk
value (Algorithm 2, line 9) and the corresponding known set of attributes that contributes the most
in the risk calculation (Algorithm 2, line 10). A set of attribute values contributing the most in the
risk calculation for the highest risk record is saved as t1 (Algorithm 2, line 11). By scanning all
sets of values for the same attributes in the dataset, we find tuples (save as t2) which incur low
information loss if we group them with t1 and generalize their attributes to have the same values
(Algorithm 2, line 12). “Low Loss Tuples” is an algorithm we developed for finding such tuples,
which is shown in Algorithm 4, and will be described in Section 4.2.1.
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Algorithm 2. RU Generalization
Input: 𝐷 = {𝑟1 , 𝑟2 , … , 𝑟𝑛 }, 𝐾𝑆 = {𝐾𝑆1 , 𝐾𝑆2 , … , 𝐾𝑆𝑚 }, 𝑃𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐶, 𝑅, 𝐺𝐻, 𝑈𝑊, 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠
Output: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎
Algorithm:
1: 𝐷′ = 𝐷; 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = sum(𝑅); 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑅 ; 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 1; 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝐶𝑃 = 0;
2: 𝐿𝐶 = matrix of 𝐿 × 𝐶 for all sets (each corresponds to one column) and all records (each
corresponds to one row);
3: 𝐷𝐾𝑆 = subsets of 𝐷 for all known sets in 𝐾𝑆;
4: 𝐹𝑇 = matrix of frequency of the known set tuples of all the records in 𝐷 (number of rows =
𝑛, number of columns = number of known sets in 𝐾𝑆);
5: 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = for each known set, unique set of known set attribute values of 𝐷 as the
search keys along with the record’s indices matching the tuple as the references;
6: 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝐹𝑢𝑛 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝐶𝑃;
7: 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛 = 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝐹𝑢𝑛;
8: while (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛) do
9:
ℎ𝑟 = record with maximum value in 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘;
10:
𝐴 = set of attributes in 𝐾𝑆[argmax (𝐿[ℎ𝑟, ] × 𝐶[ℎ𝑟, ])];
𝑖

𝑡1 = ℎ𝑟[𝐴] in 𝐷 ′ ;
𝑡2 = Low Loss Tuples(𝑡1, 𝐴, 𝐷, 𝐷′ , 𝐺𝐻, 𝑈𝑊);
𝐺𝐴 = set of attributes having different values in 𝑡1 and 𝑡2;
𝑔𝑟 = group of records in 𝐷′ containing 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 for 𝐴;
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟 = Generalize (𝑔𝑟, 𝐺𝐴, 𝐺𝐻);
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝐹𝑇, 𝐿, 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = FADR Estimate(𝐹𝑇, 𝐺𝐴, 𝐾𝑆, 𝐷𝐾𝑆, 𝑔𝑟, 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟,
𝐺𝐻, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝐾, 𝐶);
17:
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) / MaxTotal𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘;
18:
𝐷′ = replace 𝑔𝑟 records in 𝐷′ with 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟;
19:
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = sum of Loss of all attributes on the generalized records, calculated from
Eq. (14)/𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠;
20:
Append (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) to 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝐹𝑢𝑛;
21:
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑛 = min(𝑂𝑏𝑗𝐹𝑢𝑛);
22:
if 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑛 < 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛 then
23:
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝐷′ ;
24:
𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛 = 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑛;
25:
end if
26:
if 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 > 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛 then
27:
Output 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎;
28:
end if
29: end while
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
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Among the attributes in t1 and t2, the ones that have different values are going to be generalized
and are saved as GA (Algorithm 2, line 13). Group of records in the dataset that contain t1 and t2
are saved as gr (Algorithm 2, line 14), and are generalized through “Generalize” algorithm. The
generalized group is saved as GENgr (Algorithm 2, line 15). Algorithm 3 shows the generalization
algorithm. It goes over the generalized attributes of the group. If the attribute is numeric, it
generalizes the group attribute values to be the range of values in the group (Algorithm 3, line 3).
For instance, if attribute values of the records in the group are 63,65, and 66, then the generalized
value will be 63-66. It is possible that some records in the group have already been generalized
from previous iterations. For example, the group records can be 62-64, 65, and 66. Then, the
generalized value will be 62-66. If the attribute is categorical, we refer to the generalization
hierarchy tree of the attribute, and the generalized value will be the lowest common ancestor of
the values of the records in the group (Algorithm 3, line 5).
When we obtain the new generalized group (GENgr), we need to estimate the disclosure risk that
incurs on the dataset with the new generalized group. The new FADR values for the original
records based on the generalized dataset is estimated through “FADR Estimate” algorithm, shown
in Algorithm 5, which will be explained in Section 4.2.2. Then, we calculate the total normalized
FADR value of the generalized dataset, by dividing the summation of records’ estimated FADR
values by the maximum total risk, which is the total risk of the original dataset (Algorithm 2, line
17).
Algorithm 3. Generalize
Input: 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑒
Output: 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
Algorithm:
1: for each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 in 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟
2:
if 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 is numeric then
3:
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] = concatenate min(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]) and “-” and
max(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]);
4:
else
5:
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] = lowest common ancestor of 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] values
in 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑒 associated with 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟;
6:
end if
7: end for
8: Output 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠;
Afterwards, we update the records that have been selected for generalization with the generalized
values in the dataset (Algorithm 2, line 18). Having the new generalized dataset, we calculate the
total information loss, by adding the Loss of all the generalized attributes in 𝐷′ , based on Eq. (16).
Similar to normalizing the total risk, we need to normalize the total information loss. However,
the maximum information loss (𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) is a parameter that can be defined by data
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publisher (Algorithm 2, line 19). Therefore, it is possible that the total information loss of a
generalized dataset exceeds the defined maximum total Loss, which leads to normalized total Loss
value of more than one. Based on Eq.(14, the maximum Loss of an attribute is 1, which happens
when the attribute value is suppressed. For instance, if the data publisher sets 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 to
be equal to n (number of records in the dataset), a generalized dataset with n suppressed values is
considered to have maximum information loss.
Algorithm 4. Low Loss Tuples
Input: 𝑡1, 𝐴, 𝐷, 𝐷′ , 𝐺𝐻, 𝑈𝑊
Output: 𝑡2
Algorithm:
1: Initialize 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 as an empty vector of size n;
2: for each 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑 in 𝐷′
3:
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 0;
4:
for each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 in 𝐴
5:
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒 = 𝐺𝐻 associated with 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟;
6:
if 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 is numeric then
7:
𝑔𝑀𝑖𝑛 = min(𝑡1[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟], 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]);
8:
𝑔𝑀𝑎𝑥 = max(𝑡1[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟], 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]);
9:
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = (𝑔𝑀𝑎𝑥 − 𝑔𝑀𝑖𝑛)⁄𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝐷[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]) ;
10:
else
11:
𝑔 = lowest common ancestor of 𝑡1[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] and 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] in 𝐺𝐻
associated with 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟;
12:
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠=leaf counts of subtree at 𝑔 in 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒⁄leaf counts in 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒 ;
13:
end if
14:
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠+ (𝑈𝑊[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] × 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠);
15:
end for
16:
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠/𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑈𝑊[𝐴])
17:
Append 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 to 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠;
18: end for
19: if min(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) ≤ 0.1 then
20:
𝑡2 = 𝐷′ [(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 0.1), ];
21: else if min(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) ≤ 0.2 then
22:
𝑡2 = 𝐷′ [(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 0.2), ];
23: …
24: else
25:
𝑡2 = 𝐷′ [(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 1), ];
26: end if
27: Output 𝑡2;
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4.2.1 Finding Tuples with Low Loss
At each iteration of the RU Generalization algorithm, we calculate the Loss measure of records in
𝐷′ when they are grouped and generalized with t1. Then, the records which incur the lowest
information loss after generalization are selected. This procedure is indicated in Algorithm 4. We
first calculate the Loss of each attribute in A, based on Eq. (16). If the attribute is numeric, the
minimum and maximum values of t1 and 𝐷′ attribute values are considered as the range in the
numerator of the equation, and the range of attribute values in the original dataset (D) is counted
in the denominator (Algorithm 4, line 7-9). If the attribute is categorical, the lowest common
ancestor of t1 and 𝐷′ attribute values in the generalization hierarchy tree is considered as the
generalized value, and the number of leaves at the subtree of the generalized value in counted in
the numerator of the Loss formula (Algorithm 4, line 11-12).
Having the Loss of attributes in A calculated for all the records in 𝐷′ , we then calculate the
weighted Loss for each record, by considering attributes’ utility weights that are defined by the
user, based on the Eq.(15) (Algorithm 4, line 16). We append the Loss of all the records in a vector
(Algorithm 4, line 17), and records with low Loss (less than 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, etc. based on the values
exist) are chosen as t2 (Algorithm 4, line 19-26) to be grouped and generalized with t1.

4.2.2 FADR Estimate
At each iteration of RU Generalization algorithm, after creating a new generalized group, we need
the new FADR values of the records and the total FADR of the dataset. We consider different
adversaries who know different sets of attributes (known sets) about all the individuals in the
original dataset. By generalizing some records, the number of candidates matching an original
record increases. Therefore, the disclosure risk decreases. Back to the FADR measure defined in
Chapter 3, the inverse frequency term in Eq. (7) decreases at each iteration of generalization.
In order to enhance the efficiency of our RU Generalization algorithm, we estimate the records’
FADR value at each iteration, instead of calculating the exact values. Algorithm 5 shows the steps
to estimate the FADR value of the records at each iteration of the RU Generalization algorithm.
By considering the new generalized group at each iteration, the algorithm searches for the original
records that are matched in the generalized group, and increase the frequency of such records. The
estimation is considered by not updating the tuple frequencies of all the known sets. We only
update the known sets contributing the most in the FADR calculation (Algorithm 5, line 3), as well
as the known sets having tuple frequencies of low values. The latter means that the algorithm skips
updating frequencies of the known sets with all tuple frequencies more than ε, because changes on
the large frequencies have small impact on changing the FADR value (Algorithm 5, line 9-11).
For FADR estimation, since we do not increase the frequency of some known sets, the total
estimated FADR value is larger than the true value. Therefore, we over-estimate the total FADR
value.
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Algorithm 5. FADR Estimate
Input: 𝐹𝑇, 𝐺𝐴, 𝐾𝑆, 𝐿𝐶, 𝐷𝐾𝑆, 𝑔𝑟, 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟, 𝐺𝐻, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝐾, 𝐶
Output: Updated 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, Updated 𝐹𝑇, Updated Likelihood, Estimated FADR
1: 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝐹𝑇 = 𝐹𝑇;
2: 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐾𝑆 = known sets in 𝐾𝑆 containing any attributes of 𝐺𝐴;
3: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠 = known/unknown sets having max 𝐿𝐶 for records;
4: 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 = intersection of 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐾𝑆 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠;
5: 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 = 𝐷𝐾𝑆[𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆];
6: 𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠 = subsets of 𝑔𝑟 for all known sets in 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆;
7: 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠 = subsets of 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟 for all known sets in 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆;
8: for each 𝑖 in 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆
9:
if all values in 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝐹𝑇[𝑖] > ε then
10:
Next;
11:
end if
12:
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = empty vector;
13:
for each unique 𝑡 in 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠[𝑖]
14:
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = 1:number of rows in 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆[𝑖];
15:
for each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 in 𝑡
16:
if 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] is already generalized then
17:
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = MatchGeneralizedGroup(𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟, 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟],
𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆[𝑖][𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟], 𝐺𝐻);
18:
else
19:
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = index of 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆[𝑖][𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] matching 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟];
20:
end if
21:
end for
22:
Append 𝑡 in 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒[𝑖] as a new search key with 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 as a reference;
23:
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = replicate 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 by the number of times 𝑡 appears in 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠[𝑖];
24:
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 union 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥;
25:
end for
26:
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = references of tuples in 𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠[𝑖] found in 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒[𝑖];
27:
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = exclude 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 from 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠;
28:
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑇 = frequency table of 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠;
29:
Add frequency values in 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑇 to 𝐹𝑇[, 𝑖] for the matched indices;
30: end for
31: Output updated 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒; Output updated 𝐹𝑇;
1

32: 𝐿 = 𝑃𝐾 × 𝐹𝑇 , for each record and each known set;
33: Output 𝐿;
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐾𝑆)

34: 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = ∑𝑖=1
35: Output 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘;

𝐿𝑖 × 𝐶𝑖 ;
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In Algorithm 2, we initialized 𝐹𝑇 as the frequency table for all the records and all the known sets
(Algorithm 2, line 4). In Algorithm 5, such frequencies are updated based on the new generalized
group. The tuple frequencies of the known sets that contain the generalized attributes will only be
updated (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐾𝑆). In addition, to enhance the efficiency of our algorithm, we only update the
frequency of known sets contributing the most in records’ FADR values, i.e., having maximum
value in 𝐿𝐶 matrix for the records (𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠). Therefore, the algorithm only updates the sets
appear in both 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐾𝑆 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, i.e., 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 (Algorithm 5, line 4).
We also save the set of attribute values of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 in the original dataset as 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆, and
the records of the new generalized group, before and after generalization, as 𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠 and
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, respectively (Algorithm 5, line 5-7). For each known set in 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆, we look at
each unique tuple of 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, to find the original records in the corresponding 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆
that match the generalized tuple. For attributes in the tuple that are not generalized, we just check
which original records have the exact same values (Algorithm 5, line 19). For attributes in the tuple
that are generalized, we need to see which original records have values that are embedded in the
generalized value (Algorithm 5, line 17). This step is further explained in “Match Generalized
Value” algorithm, shown in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 indicates that if the checking attribute is numeric, it splits the generalized value into
two numbers of minimum and maximum of the generalized range, and outputs the index of original
records having numbers between the obtained minimum and maximum values (Algorithm 6, line
2-3). If the checking attribute is categorical, in the corresponding generalization hierarchy tree, it
finds the leaf nodes at the subtree of the generalized value, and outputs the index of original records
with attribute values that exist among the leaf nodes (Algorithm 6, line 5).
Algorithm 6. Match Generalized Value
Input:
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠, 𝐺𝐻
Output:
index of 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 which are embedded in the 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
Algorithm:
1. if 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 is numeric then
2.
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥 = split 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 on “-”;
3.
𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 = range of 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥
4. else
5.
𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 = all the leaf nodes of the subtree at 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 in 𝐺𝐻 of 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟;
6. end if
7. Output index of 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 which are included in 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠;
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Back to our “FADR Estimate” algorithm, once the matching original records found for a specific
generalized tuple, the generalized tuple with the indices of the original matched records are
appended to the 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 for the underlying known set (Algorithm 5, line 22). If the tuple
appears more than once in 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, the indices of matching original records are duplicated by
the number of times the tuple exists (Algorithm 5, line 23). Finally, after looking over all the tuples
in 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, we find all the original records (with duplicates) that match the new generalized
group (Algorithm 5, line 8-25). However, some of the found original matching records are the
records that are already matched with the tuples before generalization. Therefore, such matches
are already counted in 𝐹𝑇 from previous iterations. Thus, we need to exclude such record indices
from the found pool (Algorithm 5, line 27). Such record indices are stored in the 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
from previous iterations, as the references to the tuples in 𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, which are the tuples before
generalization (Algorithm 5, line 26).
Once we found all the records’ indices that are newly matched in the new generalized group, we
create a frequency table for such indices to see how many times each original record is matched in
the new generalized group besides the previous matches (Algorithm 5, line 28). Then, we add such
frequencies in the 𝐹𝑇 for the corresponding records and known sets (Algorithm 5, line 29). Since
the 𝐹𝑇 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 are both updated in this algorithm, and will be used in the next
iterations, this algorithm outputs the updated 𝐹𝑇 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (Algorithm 5, line 31).
After updating 𝐹𝑇, we calculate and output the likelihood and FADR measure for all the original
records (Algorithm 5, line 32-35).
Table 10. Sample adult dataset
Age

Education

Employment Type

𝒓𝟏

39

Bachelors

State-gov

𝒓𝟐

25

HS-grad

Self-emp-not-inc

𝒓𝟑

56

Bachelors

Local-gov

𝒓𝟒

22

Some-college

State-gov

𝒓𝟓

53

Bachelors

Self-emp-not-inc

𝒓𝟔

49

HS-grad

Local-gov

𝒓𝟕

67

HS-grad

Without-pay

𝒓𝟖

24

1st-4th

Private

𝒓𝟗

23

1st-4th

Private

𝒓𝟏𝟎

66

5th-6th

Private

57

4.3 Illustrative Example
In this example, we illustrate the major steps of our RU Generalization algorithm. Assume a
sample microdata, from Adult dataset, shown in Table 10, as our original dataset. At first, we
calculate the FADR measure on the original dataset, based on assigned parameters shown in Table
11, and pruning threshold of 0.01. After applying pruning algorithm described in Chapter 1, 5
known/unknown sets are remained, as shown in Table 12.
The initial frequency table (FT) of all the records and all the 5 known sets is shown in Table 13.
For instance, the second known set tuple of the first record is {State-gov} that appears 2 times in
the dataset. The initial FADR values calculated for each record is shown in Table 14.

Table 11. FADR parameters for sample adult dataset
Value
Sensitivity
Weight

Attribute
Publicly Known
Sensitivity
Probability
Weight

Attribute

Age

0.3

0

Employment Type

0.1

100

0.1

100

Education

Values
Weight
all
0
values
Without pay
1
Other than
0.1
"without pay”
Primary
1
school
Other than
0
"primary school”

Table 12. Known/unknown sets remained after pruning on the sample adult dataset
Known Sets

Unknown Sets

1

{age}

{education, employment type }

2

{employment type}

{age, education}

3 {age, employment type }

{education}

4

{education}

{age, employment type }

5

{age, education}

{ employment type }
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Table 13. Original frequency table of all known set tuples of all the records

𝒓𝟏
𝒓𝟐
𝒓𝟑
𝒓𝟒
𝒓𝟓
𝒓𝟔
𝒓𝟕
𝒓𝟖
𝒓𝟗
𝒓𝟏𝟎

KS1 KS2 KS3 KS4 KS5
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
3
1
2
1
1
3
1
2
1
1
3
1
1
1

Table 14. Initial FADR values of the records on the original dataset

r1
r2
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
r8
r9
r10

age
39
25
56
22
53
49
67
24
23
66

education
Bachelors
HS-grad
Bachelors
Some-college
Bachelors
HS-grad
HS-grad
1st-4th
1st-4th
5th-6th

type_employer
State-gov
Self-emp-not-inc
Local-gov
State-gov
Self-emp-not-inc
Local-gov
Without-pay
Private
Private
Private

FADR
2.91
2.91
2.91
3.33
2.91
2.91
29.1
32.115
32.115
32.43

The RU Generalization algorithm, starts with the record with the highest FADR value, which is
𝑟10 and the known/unknown set contributing the most in LC calculation, which is the first
known/unknown set that only contains the age attribute as the known attribute. Therefore, t1 will
be {66}, and after going through the “Low Loss Tuples” algorithm, 𝑟7 is found to be merged with
t1 as the low loss group. Therefore, the gr is:

𝒓𝟕
𝒓𝟏𝟎

Age

Education

Employment Type

67
66

HS-grad
5th-6th

Without-pay
Private
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And after applying generalization, GENgr will be:

Age

Education

Employment Type

𝒓𝟕

66-67

HS-grad

Without-pay

𝒓𝟏𝟎

66-67

5th-6th

Private

The “FADR Estimate” algorithm goes over all the known sets containing the generalized attribute
(Age in this example), which are KS1, KS3, and KS5.
For KS1 ({age}), the generalized group has two same tuples of {66-67}. Checking the {age} tuples
in the original dataset, 𝑟7 and 𝑟10 are found to be matched with this generalized tuple. Since {6667} appears two times in the generalized group, we double the found matched record indices: {𝑟7 ,
𝑟10, 𝑟7 , 𝑟10}.

Table 15. IndexStructure of the first known set before generalization
Search Key References
39
𝑟1
25
𝑟2
56
𝑟3
22
𝑟4
53
𝑟5
49
𝑟6
67
𝑟7
24
𝑟8
23
𝑟9
66
𝑟10
In addition, we need to search the tuples of gr in the IndexStructure to find the matching records
that are already counted in FT. IndexStructure of the first known set ({age}) is shown in Table 15.
{66} and {67} are the first known set tuples of gr. Searching in the IndexStructure, {66} has the
reference of 𝑟10 and {67} has the reference of 𝑟7 . Therefore, {𝑟7 , 𝑟10} is excluded from {𝑟7 , 𝑟10, 𝑟7 ,
𝑟10}, and finally {𝑟7 , 𝑟10} is remained as the records that are newly affected by the generalization.
Each of the affected records are found once, and therefore their frequencies in FT are added by 1.
The updated FT and IndexStructure are shown in Table 16 and Table 17 , respectively.
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Table 16. Updated frequency table after the first generalization on the first known set

𝒓𝟏
𝒓𝟐
𝒓𝟑
𝒓𝟒
𝒓𝟓
𝒓𝟔
𝒓𝟕
𝒓𝟖
𝒓𝟗
𝒓𝟏𝟎

KS1
KS2 KS3 KS4 KS5
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
3
1
1+1 = 2
1
3
1
2
1
1
3
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
1 +1 = 2

Table 17. IndexStructure of the first known set after generalization
Search Key References
39
𝑟1
25
𝑟2
56
𝑟3
22
𝑟4
53
𝑟5
49
𝑟6
67
𝑟7
24
𝑟8
23
𝑟9
66
𝑟10
66-67
𝑟7 , 𝑟10

4.4 Calculating FADR Exposed by an Anonymized Dataset
In the RU Generalization algorithm, we have over-estimated the FADR values at each iteration,
by not updating all the known sets’ frequencies. Once a generalized dataset is obtained from the
RU generalization algorithm, the true FADR values need to be calculated for the records in the
generalized dataset.
Our FADR calculation over an anonymized dataset follows the “maximum knowledge attacker
model” [9], which considers an adversary who knows both the original and anonymized dataset
and tries to do mapping between the two. Likewise, we start with the original dataset (𝐷), and for
each record and known set of attributes, we find matching records in the anonymized dataset. Once
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we find frequency of the known set tuples of original records in the anonymized dataset, we can
compute the FADR measure by multiplying the publicly known probabilities of the sets and the
consequence values that are already calculated.

Algorithm 7. FADR Calculation
Input:
𝐷, 𝐷′, 𝐾𝑆, 𝑃𝐾, 𝐺𝐻, 𝐶
Output:
FADR
Algorithm:
1: 𝐷𝐾𝑆 = subsets of 𝐷 for all known sets in 𝐾𝑆;
2: 𝐷′𝐾𝑆 = subsets of 𝐷′ for all known sets in 𝐾𝑆;
3: 𝐹𝑇 = matrix of frequency of the known set tuples of all the records in 𝐷 (number of rows =
𝑛, number of columns = number of known sets in 𝐾𝑆);
4: for each 𝑖 in 𝐾𝑆
5:
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = empty vector;
6:
for each unique 𝑡 in 𝐷′𝐾𝑆[𝑖]
7:
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = 1: 𝑛 ;
8:
for each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 in 𝑡
9:
if 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] is already generalized then
10:
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = Match Generalized Value(𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟, 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟],
𝐷𝐾𝑆[𝑖][𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟], 𝐺𝐻);
11:
else
12:
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = index of 𝐷𝐾𝑆[𝑖][𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] matching 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟];
13:
end if
14:
end for
15:
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = replicate 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 by the number of times 𝑡 appears in 𝐷′𝐾𝑆[𝑖];
16:
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 union 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥;
17:
end for
18:
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑇 = frequency table of 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠;
19:
𝐹𝑇[, 𝑖] = frequency values in 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑇 for the matched indices;
20: end for
1

21: 𝐿 = 𝑃𝐾 × 𝐹𝑇 , for each record and each known set;
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐾𝑆)

22: 𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 = ∑𝑖=1
23: Output 𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅;

𝐿𝑖 × 𝐶𝑖 ;
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Algorithm 7 indicates the steps to find the frequency of the known tuples of the original records in
the generalized dataset. It is similar to Algorithm 5 (FADR Estimate), illustrated in Chapter 4, with
the difference in the target generalized records. Since Algorithm 5 was called in each iteration of
our RU Generalization algorithm, for the computation efficiency, we considered only the new
generalized group to count the frequency of the matching original tuples, and we needed to exclude
the matchings that were already counted in previous iterations. In Algorithm 7, we have the entire
generalized dataset (𝐷′), and for each generalized record and every known set, we find matching
original tuples, through Algorithm 6 (Match Generalized Value). For each original record and
specific known set, the frequency table is populated with the frequency value of the corresponding
original tuple in the generalized dataset (line 19). 𝑃𝐾 and 𝐶, are publicly known probabilities of
the known/unknown sets and consequence values of the records for each unknown set,
respectively. The two parameters are pre-calculated based on the defined parameters for FADR
measure, described in Chapter 3.

4.5 Experiments
In this experiment, we applied our RU Generalization algorithm on the same Adult sample dataset
used in the experiment of Chapter 3. The input parameters of our algorithm in this experiment are
shown in Table 18. The generalization hierarchy trees used for the categorical attributes are shown
in Table 19-26.

Table 18. RU Generalization algorithm input parameter values
RU Generalization
Algorithm
Input Parameter
𝑫
𝑲𝑺, 𝑷𝑲, 𝑳, 𝑪, 𝑹

Value
Adult sample dataset, 9 attributes and 30162 records
(same dataset used in Chapter 3 experiment)
Obtained from Chapter 3 experiment, with the FADR parameter
values shown in Table 5 and pruning threshold of 0.01

𝑮𝑯

Shown in Table 19-26

𝑼𝑾

1 for all attributes

𝑴𝒂𝒙𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝑳𝒐𝒔𝒔

2𝑛, 𝑛, and 𝑛⁄2

In this experiment, since we are not considering specific use purpose of the dataset, we assume
that all the attributes are in the same level of importance, and assigned the utility weight of 1 for
all the attributes. For normalizing total Loss, we tested different values of 2𝑛, 𝑛, and 𝑛⁄2 for
maximum total Loss parameter, to examine the output change of the algorithm. 𝑛 is the size of our
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Adult sample dataset, which equals 30,162. The total loss of 𝑛 can be interpreted as a dataset with
𝑛 suppressed values.

Table 19. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Race"
Level0

Level1

White

*

Asian-Pac-Islander

*

Amer-Indian-Eskimo

*

Other

*

Black

*

Table 20. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Work Class"
Level0

Level1

Level2

Private

Non-Government

*

Self-emp-not-inc Non-Government

*

Self-emp-inc

Non-Government

*

Federal-gov

Government

*

Local-gov

Government

*

State-gov

Government

*

Without-pay

Unemployed

*

Never-worked

Unemployed

*

Table 21. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Gender"
Level0

Level1

Male

*

Female

*
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Table 22. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Marital status"
Level0

Level1

Level2

Divorced

Spouse not present

*

Never-married

Spouse not present

*

Separated

Spouse not present

*

Widowed

Spouse not present

*

Married-spouse-absent

Spouse not present

*

Married-civ-spouse

Spouse present

*

Married-AF-spouse

Spouse present

*

Table 23 . Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Education"
Level0

Level1

Level2

Level3

Bachelors

Undergraduate

Higher education

*

Some-college

Undergraduate

Higher education

*

Prof-school

Professional Education

Higher education

*

Assoc-acdm

Professional Education

Higher education

*

Assoc-voc

Professional Education

Higher education

*

Masters

Graduate

Higher education

*

Doctorate

Graduate

Higher education

*

1st-4th

Primary School

Primary education

*

5th-6th

Primary School

Primary education

*

Preschool

Primary School

Primary education

*

11th

High School

Secondary education

*

HS-grad

High School

Secondary education

*

9th

High School

Secondary education

*

7th-8th

High School

Secondary education

*

12th

High School

Secondary education

*

10th

High School

Secondary education

*
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Table 24. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Occupation"
Level0

Level1

Level2

Sales

Nontechnical

*

Exec-managerial

Nontechnical

*

Handlers-cleaners

Nontechnical

*

Other-service

Other

*

Adm-clerical

Other

*

Farming-fishing

Other

*

Transport-moving

Other

*

Priv-house-serv

Other

*

Protective-serv

Other

*

Armed-Forces

Other

*

Tech-support

Technical

*

Craft-repair

Technical

*

Prof-specialty

Technical

*

Machine-op-inspct

Technical

*

Table 25. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Income"
Level0

Level1

<=50K

*

>50K

*

In this experiment, we ran our RU Generalization algorithm three times, with three different values
of maximum total Loss. Figure 13-15 show the reduction in normalized total estimated FADR and
the increase in normalized total Loss, as our algorithm iteratively generalizes the dataset, for the
three trials. The optimum point chosen by the algorithm is cross marked in the figures, which is
the point of global minimum of the objective function. As described in Algorithm 2, line 26, when
the normalized total Loss gets larger than the global minimum, the algorithm terminates. This is
indicated in Figure 13-15, where the last point of iteration has normalized total Loss value larger
than the marked global minimum.
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Table 26. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Country"
Level0
South
Cambodia
India
Japan
China
Iran
Philippines
Vietnam
Laos
Taiwan
Thailand
Hong
England
Germany
Greece
Italy
Poland
Portugal
Ireland
France
Hungary
Scotland
Yugoslavia
Holland-Netherlands
United-States
Puerto-Rico
Canada
Outlying-US
Cuba
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Dominican-Republic
Haiti
Guatemala
El-Salvador
Ecuador
Columbia
Nicaragua
Trinidad &Tobago
Peru

Level1
Level2
Africa
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Asia
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
Europe
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
North America
*
South America
*
South America
*
South America
*
South America
*
South America
*
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The only difference between the three trials is the value of maximum total Loss, which only affects
the normalized values of the total Loss at each iteration. In all the three trials, the normalized total
estimated FADR obtained at each iteration is the same. Therefore, the blue chart line in Figure 1315 are all the same. The total Loss at each iteration for all the three trials are all the same as well.
However, since the maximum total Loss is different, the normalized total Loss at each iteration is
different in the three trials. Consequently, the objective function, which is the sum of normalized
total FADR and normalized total Loss, has different trend in the three trials.
Smaller value of the maximum total Loss makes the value of total loss to be normalized to a larger
value. Thus, as shown in Figure 13-15, when the maximum total Loss decreases from 2𝑛 to 𝑛⁄2,
at each iteration the value of the normalized total Loss increases. Therefore, from Figure 13 to
Figure 15, the slop of the orange chart line increases. As a result, since the blue chart line is
constant in the figures, the minimum point of the grey chart line, which is the sum of blue and
orange charts, happens at the earlier iterations, when the maximum total Loss decreases from 2𝑛
to 𝑛⁄2. In addition, larger values of the normalized total Loss, with the constant normalized FADR,
lead to higher values of the objective function. Thus, from Figure 13 to Figure 15, the global
minimum of the objective function increases.
For the trial of the 2𝑛 maximum total Loss, Figure 13 indicates that our algorithm stopped after
518 iterations, since the normalized total Loss (44.38%) went above the minimum point of the
objective function (31.91%). The optimum generalized dataset is achieved at the 471st iteration,
when the normalized estimated total disclosure risk is 22.74% (77.26% reduction) and normalized
total information loss is 9.17% (9.17% increase).
For the trial of the 𝑛 maximum total Loss, Figure 14 indicates that our algorithm stopped after 512
iterations, since the normalized total Loss (51.32%) went above the minimum point of the objective
function (40.09%). The optimum generalized dataset is achieved at the 441st iteration, when the
normalized estimated total disclosure risk is 26.27% (73.73% reduction) and normalized total
information loss is 13.83% (13.83% increase). For this trial, after we obtained the optimum
generalized dataset, at the 441st iteration, we ran the Algorithm 7, to find out the true total FADR
value. The actual normalized total FADR value of the generalized dataset derived as 18.34%,
which is 7.93% lower than the estimated value.
For the trial of the 𝑛⁄2 maximum total Loss, Figure 15 indicates that our algorithm stopped after
512 iterations, since the normalized total Loss (102.64%) went above the minimum point of the
objective function (50.32%). As mentioned earlier, the normalized total Loss can exceed 100%
when the total loss of a generalized dataset exceeds the user defined maximum total Loss. The
optimum generalized dataset is achieved at the 353rd iteration, when the normalized estimated total
disclosure risk is 34.10% (65.9% reduction) and normalized total information loss is 16.22%
(16.22% increase).

68

Normalized Total Estimated FADR

Normalized Total Loss
(Max Total Loss = 2n)
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0%

# of iterations

Figure 13. Trend of risk and information loss over the iterations of RU Generalization algorithm,
when MaxTotalLoss = 2n
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Figure 14. Trend of risk and information loss over the iterations of RU Generalization algorithm,
when MaxTotalLoss = n
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Figure 15. Trend of risk and information loss over the iterations of RU Generalization algorithm,
when MaxTotalLoss = n/2

25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
n/2

n

2n

Maximum Total Loss
Total Estimated FADR

Total Loss

Figure 16. Effect of maximum total Loss on the non-normalized values of total estimated FADR
and total Loss at the optimum point

Figure 16 shows the non-normalized values of the total estimated FADR and total Loss at the
optimum point, in the three trials. Increasing maximum total Loss, makes the total loss values to
be normalized to smaller values. Therefore, the information loss portion of the objective function
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gets lower values at each iteration. As a result, our algorithm, with the higher maximum total loss
assignment, iterates more to reach a lower objective function. Iterating more applies more
generalization, which results in lower disclosure risk but higher information loss.
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5

ANONYMIZED DATASET EVALUATION

An anonymized dataset is evaluated in terms of the amount of both privacy and data utility it
preserves. Disclosure risk measure can be used to quantify privacy preservation, and information
loss metric is a measure of data utility. In this chapter, we evaluate the generalized dataset obtained
from our RU Generalization algorithm, described in Chapter 4, by calculating FADR and Loss
measures, to evaluate privacy and data utility preservation, respectively. The total Loss of a
generalized dataset is derived by the sum of Loss of all the attributes on the generalized records,
calculated from Eq. (14, based on the defined generalization hierarchies for the attributes. The
FADR measure of a generalized dataset is calculated through Algorithm 7, described in Chapter
4.
In this chapter, we also aim at comparing our RU Generalization algorithm with the benchmark
generalization algorithms. We use the ARX Data Anonymization Tool [51], for implementing the
benchmark local recoding generalization on Adult dataset, with average re-identification risk
privacy model, to obtain different generalized datasets. We then compare the generalized datasets
obtained from ARX Anonymization Tool with the generalized dataset obtained from our RU
Generalization algorithm, with respect to the FADR and Loss measures.

5.1 ARX Data Anonymization Tool
ARX is a comprehensive software for anonymizing structured microdata based on user-defined
privacy criteria, utility measure, and data transformation technique [52]. To be able to compare the
results from ARX and our developed RU Generalization algorithm, we selected average reidentification risk measure for the privacy criteria, Loss for the utility measure, and local
generalization as the transformation technique. Like our RU Generalization algorithm,
generalization hierarchies for the attributes need to be defined in ARX to perform generalization
and calculate data utility measures. ARX requires the users to specify the type of attributes,
whether they are direct-identifier, quasi-identifier, sensitive, or insensitive attributes. This is
required for benchmark anonymization algorithms, as described in the literature. However, in
Chapter 3, we explained that classifying attributes is not practical since an adversary with any
background knowledge and disclosure target may exist, and by classifying attributes we only
model a specific adversary. We have addressed this issue in FADR measure by considering various
known and unknown sets of attributes. Since our developed RU Generalization algorithm utilizes
the FADR measure, different known and unknown sets are taken into consideration for
anonymization in contrast to the ARX anonymization that only considers one known set of quasiidentifiers. Figure 17 shows an example screenshot of the ARX software for configuring the
transformation. On the left, the input data is illustrated. On the right, the user needs to specify
different parameters. For instance, the age attribute is classified as a quasi-identifier, and the
transformation is selected to be generalization. The generalization hierarchy for the age attribute
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is also imported on the right-hand side. Below the generalization hierarchy is where to add the
privacy criteria and utility measures.
ARX employs the Flash algorithm to perform anonymization [53]. The Flash algorithm initially
builds a generalization lattice by combining the generalization hierarchies. For example, consider
the three attributes of Employment type, Gender, and Age. Example generalization hierarchies for
such attributes are shown in Figure 18. It shows that Employment type has 2, Gender has 1, and
Age has 5 levels of generalization. Based on such hierarchies, a generalization lattice is built as
shown in Figure 19. Each node represents one transformation. For instance, (1,0,2) means the
employment type is generalized to level 1, gender is not generalized (level 0), and age is
generalized to level 2. Each level shown in the generalization lattice corresponds to the total level
of generalizations of the transformations at that level.

Figure 17. ARX transformation configuration

All the privacy criteria implemented in ARX have the monotonicity property, meaning that if a
transformation meets the privacy criteria, all the successor’ transformations in the generalization
lattice meet the criteria as well. Likewise, if it does not meet the privacy criteria, all the
predecessor’s transformations do not meet the criteria. Therefore, whenever the Flash algorithm
checks a transformation, based on whether it meets the criteria or not, it tags the predecessors or
successors as either the candidate solutions or pruned transformations. For instance, in Figure 19,
the dark gray nodes are tagged as pruned transformations while the light gray nodes are tagged as
the candidate solutions. The tagged transformations will no longer be checked by the algorithm,
which improves the efficiency of the algorithm.
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Figure 18. Example generalization hierarchies for building the generalization lattice

Figure 19. Illustration of the first iteration of Flash algorithm on the generalization lattice [53]
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The Flash algorithm navigates through all the levels of the generalization lattice, from the lowest
level to the top. At each iteration, it takes one node of the level, and creates a path of non-tagged
nodes through a depth-first search towards the top node. Once the path is created, a binary search
is implemented on the path. The search starts at the node in the middle level of the path and checks
the privacy criteria. If the transformation meets the criteria, all the successors in the lattice are
tagged as candidate solutions and the binary search goes into the lower half of the path. If the
transformation does not meet the criteria, all the predecessors in the lattice are pruned and the
binary search goes into the upper half of the path. The algorithm stops when all nodes are tagged.
Among the candidate solutions, the one incurring minimum information loss is selected as the
optimum solution.
Figure 19 shows the first iteration of the flash algorithm. It starts from (0,0,0) and creates a path
to (2,1,5) illustrated with the dashed green flashes. For binary search, the first node to check the
privacy criteria is (0,0,4). Since it does not meet the criteria, all the predecessors are pruned as
shown in dark gray. Then, the node at the middle level of the upper half of the path is checked,
which is (1,0,5). Again, it does not meet the criteria, and all the predecessors are pruned. The next
node to check is (2,0,5), which meets the criteria, and therefore is tagged as a candidate solution
along with all its successors (shown in light grey).
As mentioned earlier, we have selected average re-identification risk as our privacy criteria in
ARX. This privacy model ensures that the average re-identification risk of records in the dataset,
after anonymization, is less than a user-defined threshold. This criteria is checked in the following
steps [52]:
1. Apply transformation to data.
2. While risk estimate is greater than the threshold:
2.1. Suppress all the records in the equivalence class which incurs the highest
information loss.
2.2. Recalculate re-identification risk.
3. If the number of suppressed records is lower than a user-defined suppression limit, the
privacy criteria is met and the transformation is a candidate solution.
The Flash algorithm applies global recoding generalization, which transforms all the values of a
quasi-identifier to the same level of generalization. However, in ARX, we can enable the local
recording feature to be added to the Flash algorithm. ARX will perform local recoding by
recursively executing a global transformation algorithm on records that have been suppressed in
the previous iteration. With this method, a significant improvement in data quality can be achieved.
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5.2 RU Generalization Algorithm vs. ARX Average Re-identification Risk Model
The global transformation algorithm in ARX anonymization tool tends to incur higher information
loss than our developed RU Generalization algorithm. In ARX, the generalization is applied to all
the records, at each iteration, whereas our RU Generalization algorithm applies generalization to
only a group of records with the lowest information loss that contains the highest risk record, at
each iteration.
Our RU Generalization algorithm targets the records with the highest disclosure risk, at each
iteration of generalization, to reduce the maximum disclosure risk by incurring low information
loss. In ARX, the generalization is applied to all the records to reduce the total disclosure risk,
without prioritizing the records at high risk of disclosure.
The average re-identification risk model in ARX only considers identity disclosure risk, whereas
our RU Generalization algorithm works with FADR measure which is a combined measure of
identity and attribute disclosure risk. In addition, ARX requires a pre-defined set of quasiidentifiers and sensitive attributes, which restricts the background knowledge and disclosure target
of an adversary. FADR measure used in RU Generalization algorithm gives the flexibility in
modeling adversaries by assigning different publicly known probabilities and sensitivity weights
to attributes.

5.2.1 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the disclosure risk and information loss of the generalized datasets
obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm and ARX anonymization tool, and compare our
algorithm with the benchmark algorithm implemented in ARX.
Table 27 shows the parameters we used in this experiment, for our algorithm and in ARX. We
have executed the average re-identification risk privacy model in ARX, with Flash algorithm, on
our Adult sample dataset, to obtain the local generalized dataset. As described earlier, in ARX, we
need to define the type of attributes, and for average re-identification risk privacy model,
specifying quasi-identifiers is required. In our FADR measure and RU Generalization algorithm,
we do not specify the quasi-identifiers. Instead, we assign publicly known probabilities to
attributes and build various known sets of attributes, with different probabilities, and consider all
in FADR measure and RU Generalization algorithm. In order to make the setting of ARX and our
RU Generalization algorithm similar, we choose the attributes that appear in the longest known
sets to be quasi-identifiers in ARX. Such attributes are {Age, Work class, Education, Occupation,
Race, Gender, Country}.
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Table 27. Parameters of our RU Generalization algorithm and ARX anonymization tool
Algorithm
RU Generalization
Algorithm

Parameters
All parameters shown in Table 18, Except MaxTotalLoss = n

Dataset:

Quasi-identifiers:

ARX Anonymization tool

Privacy Model:

Adult sample dataset, 9
attributes and 30162 records
(same dataset used in Chapter
3 experiment)
{Age, Work class, Education,
Occupation, Race, Gender,
Country}
Average Re-identification
Risk

Maximum Average Reidentification Risk:

{0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3}

Information Loss Metric:

Loss

Suppression Limit:

100%

Local Recoding:

Enabled

It is also recommended, in ARX, to set the suppression limit to 100%, in order to balance the
generalization and suppression to achieve the optimal solution [52].
As described earlier, the average re-identification risk privacy model in ARX ensures that the
average re-identification risk of records does not exceed a maximum value predefined by user. In
our experiments, we set the parameter to the values 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, to obtain different
generalized datasets. Then, we calculated the FADR values of the obtained datasets, through
Algorithm 7. For the calculation of likelihood and consequence, we used the same parameters of
Chapter 3, shown in Table 5. The total FADR of the generalized dataset is then calculated as the
sum of all the records’ FADR values. We then normalized the total FADR, by dividing the values
by the maximum total FADR, which is for the original dataset. In addition, we calculated the total
Loss of the generalized datasets by adding the Loss of all attributes of the generalized records,
calculated from Eq. (14, based on the attributes’ generalization hierarchies, shown in Chapter 4.
We considered the maximum information loss to be equal to n, which implies that the highest
information loss occurs when we have n suppressed values in the generalized dataset. With such
maximum Loss value, we normalized the total Loss values.
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Table 28 illustrates the comparison of disclosure risk and information loss between the optimum
generalized dataset obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm and ARX anonymization tool.
The superscripts of ARX in the table represent the maximum average re-identification risk
specified at each trial. The total FADR and total Loss measures in the table are normalized. Total
FADR is normalized by being divided by the maximum total FADR, which is the total FADR of
the original dataset. Total Loss is normalized by being divided by a user-defined maximum total
Loss value. In the experiment, we set it to the size of dataset, which is n.

Table 28. Comparing FADR and Loss of the generalized datasets obtained from ARX and our
RU Generalization algorithm.
Max
Normalized
Record's
Total
FADR
FADR %
Value

Normalized
Total Loss %
(max total loss =
n)

Objective
Function
(Total FADR
%+
Total Loss %)

Execution
Time
(sec)

Original Data

69.16

100.00%

0.00%

100.00%

-------

𝑨𝑹𝑿𝟎.𝟎𝟏

12.81

2.95%

178.65%

181.60%

3.08

𝑨𝑹𝑿𝟎.𝟏

6.14

4.62%

69.22%

73.84%

2.42

𝑨𝑹𝑿𝟎.𝟐

25.98

7.43%

38.06%

45.48%

2.21

𝑨𝑹𝑿𝟎.𝟑

54.57

12.75%

24.39%

37.14%

2.04

RU
Generalization
Algorithm

5.92

18.34%

13.83%

32.17%

13,425.31

Table 28 indicates that as the maximum average risk of the privacy model in ARX increases, the
total FADR increases and the total Loss decreases. Since we have defined the maximum
information loss, it is possible that the normalized total Loss exceeds the 100 percent. That means
the total information loss exceeds the maximum value the user defined. Comparing the total FADR
and total Loss of the generalized datasets from ARX and our algorithm, we can see that our
algorithm produces the highest total disclosure risk and the lowest total information loss. Although
the total disclosure risk of our algorithm is highest, the maximum of records’ FADR values in our
obtained generalized dataset is 5.92, which is the lowest maximum record’s FADR value compared
to the ARX generalized datasets. This indicates the effectiveness of our algorithm in targeting the
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records at high risk of disclosure and reducing the disclosure risk at the record level. Besides, we
can see that ARX does not prioritize the high-risk records by comparing the two privacy models
of 0.01 and 0.1 maximum average risk thresholds. The former outputs higher maximum record’s
FADR value while incurring lower total FADR.
To evaluate the generalized datasets based on both disclosure risk and information loss at the same
time, we considered the objective function defined in Chapter 4, as the summation of normalized
total FADR and normalized total Loss. Table 28 shows that our algorithm outputs the minimum
of the objective function, compared to the ARX outputs.
The execution time of the algorithms are shown in Table 28. ARX anonymization tool is highly
efficient in time, compared to our algorithm, because of the pruning strategy that is used in global
recoding algorithm. As described before, the privacy models in ARX have monotonicity property,
which enables the pruning strategy on the generalization lattice. The privacy model we used in our
experiments is average re-identification risk model, which only measures the identity disclosure
by considering the inverse frequency of the known tuples. However, our RU Generalization
algorithm uses the FADR measure which also considers the attribute disclosure attacks and
therefore is not monotone in the generalization lattice and cannot employ the pruning strategy. Our
RU Generalization algorithm is slower because of our greedy approach of reducing the disclosure
risk of high-risk records by incurring low information loss, at each iteration. The high execution
time of our algorithm results in a considerable decrease in information loss and significant
reduction in maximum disclosure risk.
Figure 20 compares the distribution of records’ FADR values in the original dataset, the
generalized dataset obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm, and ARX with 0.3 maximum
average re-identification risk model. It shows that most records in the original dataset have high
disclosure risk. With ARX, the majority of records converted to low risk records (FADR between
0 and 0.1). However, a few records (76 records) still have high disclosure risk (FADR between 10
and 70). With our generalization algorithm, no records with disclosure risk of more than 10 exist,
and the majority of records are converted to have FADR values between 0.1 and 0.2.
Figure 21 illustrates the percentage of original values in each attribute that are remained intact
after generalization, with both ARX and our RU Generalization algorithm. The Gender attribute
has not been generalized with either ARX or our RU Generalization algorithm. The attributes that
have been generalized are Age, Work class, Education, Occupation, Race, and Country. These are
the attributes that have been classified as quasi-identifiers in ARX, and appeared in the known sets
of our RU Generalization algorithm. Figure 21 shows that the generalized dataset obtained from
our RU Generalization algorithm better preserves the original values of Age, Education,
Occupation, and Country attributes, compared to the generalized datasets obtained from ARX
trials. Race attribute has not been generalized with ARX but our RU Generalization algorithm
generalizes 0.54% of the Race values. Work class attribute has the highest number of nongeneralized values in ARX trial of 0.1 maximum average record’s risk parameter.
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Original Dataset

RU Generalization

ARX 0.3

16,000
14,000

Frequency

12,000
10,000
8,000
Original Dataset, 2092
6,000

4,000
ARX 0.3, 76
2,000
0
0-0.1

0.1-0.2

0.2-0.3

0.3-0.4

0.4-0.5

0.5-1

1-10

10-70

RU Generalization, 0

Record's FADR Value

Figure 20. Distribution of records' FADR values on original dataset and generalized datasets obtained
from our algorithm and ARX

Figure 21 indicates the percentage of attribute values that are not generalized. To see the details
on the generalized values, Table 30-35 show the distribution of attribute values in the generalized
datasets from ARX and our RU Generalization algorithm. Since our algorithm and the ARX
implementation are both using local recoding generalization, we can see that the attributes in the
generalized datasets have values from multiple levels of generalizations.
Table 30 shows how the Age attribute values are generalized. ARX follows a generalization
hierarchy for Age attribute, shown in Table 29. However, our RU Generalization algorithm does
not use generalization hierarchy trees for the numeric attributes. Our RU Generalization algorithm
generalizes the age value to the range of values of the group that is going to be generalized.
Therefore, as Table 30 shows, our algorithm creates more categories of age generalized values
compared to ARX that has specific levels of generalizations.
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Age

Work class

85.32%

98.73%

93.65%

91.07%

88.05%

RU
Generalization

ARX - 0.3

ARX - 0.2

74.25%
63.14%
40.79%

RU
Generalization

ARX - 0.3

ARX - 0.2

ARX - 0.1

Education

Occupation
99.81%

98.89%
91.07%

RU
Generalization

ARX - 0.1

ARX - 0.3

91.07%
73.54%

76.43%

ARX - 0.2

ARX - 0.1

88.05%
76.43%

RU
Generalization

Race

ARX - 0.3

ARX - 0.2

ARX - 0.1

Country

99.46%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

RU
Generalization

ARX - 0.3

ARX - 0.2

ARX - 0.1

93.97%

91.07%

88.05%

88.61%

RU
Generalization

ARX - 0.3

ARX - 0.2

ARX - 0.1

Figure 21. Percentage of original values in each attribute that are preserved in the generalized
datasets obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm and from the ARX Anonymization Tool
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Table 29. Generalization hierarchy tree for Age attribute used in ARX
Level 1
[1, 5]
[6, 10]
[11, 15]
[16, 20]
[21, 25]
[26, 30]
[31, 35]
[36, 40]
[41, 45]
[46, 50]
[51, 55]
[56, 60]
[61, 65]
[66, 70]
[71, 75]
[76, 80]
[81, 85]
[86, 90]
[91, 95]
[96, 100]

Level 2
[1, 10]
[1, 10]
[11, 20]
[11, 20]
[21, 30]
[21, 30]
[31, 40]
[31, 40]
[41, 50]
[41, 50]
[51, 60]
[51, 60]
[61, 70]
[61, 70]
[71, 80]
[71, 80]
[81, 90]
[81, 90]
[91, 100]
[91, 100]

Level 3
[1, 20]
[1, 20]
[1, 20]
[1, 20]
[21, 40]
[21, 40]
[21, 40]
[21, 40]
[41, 60]
[41, 60]
[41, 60]
[41, 60]
[61, 80]
[61, 80]
[61, 80]
[61, 80]
[81, 100]
[81, 100]
[81, 100]
[81, 100]

Level 4
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Table 31 shows that 4.94% of the Work class attribute values, in the generalized dataset obtained
from our RU Generalization algorithm, are generalized to Government, Non-Government,
Unemployed categories while 1.38% of the values are suppressed.
Table 32 shows that about 1% of the Education attribute values, in the generalized dataset obtained
from our RU Generalization algorithm, are generalized to Primary School, High School,
Undergraduate, Graduate, Professional Education categories, and less than one percent are either
generalized to Primary Education, Secondary Education, Higher Education categories or have
been suppressed.
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Table 30. Generalized values for Age attribute in the obtained generalized datasets
Generalized Values
ARX
0.3

RU Generalization Algorithm
[17, 20], [20, 32], [26, 36], [32, 75], [38, 47], [48, 68]
[17, 22], [20, 34], [26, 47], [33, 37], [38, 51], [48, 90]
[17, 23], [20, 43], [27, 42], [33, 40], [38, 52], [49, 66]
[17, 26], [20, 55], [27, 43], [33, 51], [38, 59], [49, 90]
[17, 29], [21, 28], [27, 47], [33, 52], [38, 63], [50, 61]
[17, 31], [21, 31], [27, 53], [33, 53], [40, 49], [50, 68]
[17, 33], [21, 34], [27, 77], [33, 54], [40, 56], [51, 65]
[17, 34], [21, 42], [28, 33], [33, 59], [40, 58], [52, 70]
[17, 35], [21, 46], [28, 43], [33, 61], [40, 62], [53, 90]
[17, 36], [22, 44], [28, 47], [33, 66], [41, 68], [55, 64]
[17, 47], [22, 49], [28, 49], [33, 90], [43, 60], [55, 66]
[17, 71], [23, 29], [28, 56], [34, 55], [44, 75], [55, 69]
[17, 75], [23, 37], [29, 30], [34, 57], [45, 59], [55, 71]
[17, 77], [23, 40], [29, 31], [35, 71], [45, 69], [56, 66]
[17, 80], [23, 41], [29, 43], [36, 47], [46, 57], [57, 71]
[18, 29], [23, 43], [29, 45], [36, 50], [46, 60], [61, 90]
[18, 31], [23, 49], [30, 40], [36, 52], [46, 66], [62, 90]
[18, 32], [23, 58], [31, 34], [36, 55], [47, 59], [65, 68]
[18, 35], [24, 27], [31, 77], [36, 57], [47, 61], [65, 90]
[19, 26], [24, 62], [32, 33], [37, 41], [47, 70], [67, 90]
[19, 29], [25, 40], [32, 43], [38, 44], [48, 62], [70, 90]
[19, 33], [25, 41], [32, 48], [38, 45], [48, 65], [71, 90]
[72, 90]

[1, 20]
[21, 40]
[41, 60]
[61, 80]
[81, 100]

ARX
0.2

ARX
0.1

*
[1, 20]
[11, 20]
[21, 30]
[21, 40]
[31, 40]
[41, 50]
[41, 60]
[51, 60]
[61, 70]
[61, 80]
[71, 80]
[81,100]

*
[1, 20]
[16, 20]
[21, 25]
[21, 40]
[26, 30]
[31, 35]
[36, 40]
[41, 45]
[41, 60]
[46, 50]
[51, 55]
[56, 60]
[61, 65]
[61, 80]
[66, 70]
[81,100]

Table 33 shows that in the generalized dataset obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm,
0.19% of the Occupation attribute values are generalized to Technical, Non-Technical, Other
categories while no values are suppressed.
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Table 31. Relative frequency of Work class attribute values in different generalization levels

Generalization Levels of Attribute
“Work Class”

Level 1
Level 0
{Government,
Level 2
{original values} Non-Government,
{*}
Unemployed}

RU Generalization Algorithm

93.65%

4.94%

1.38%

0.3 max average re-identification risk

91.07%

8.93%

0.00%

0.2 max average re-identification risk

88.05%

11.95%

0.00%

0.1 max average re-identification risk

98.73%

0.00%

1.27%

Table 32. Relative frequency of Education attribute values in different generalization levels

Generalization Levels
of Attribute
“Education”

RU Generalization
Algorithm
0.3 max average
re-identification risk
0.2 max average
re-identification risk
0.1 max average
re-identification risk

Level 0
{original
values}

Level 1
{Primary School,
High School,
Undergraduate,
Graduate,
Professional
Education}

Level 2
{Primary
Education,
Secondary
Education, Higher
Education}

98.89%

1.01%

0.02%

0.08%

91.07%

0.00%

8.93%

0.00%

73.54%

25.11%

0.00%

1.35%

76.43%

12.17%

10.12%

1.27%
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Level 3
{*}

Table 33. Relative frequency of Occupation attribute values in different generalization levels

Generalization Levels
of Attribute “Occupation”

Level 0
{original
values}

Level 1
{Technical,
Non-Technical,
Other}

RU Generalization Algorithm

99.81%

0.19%

0.00%

91.07%

8.93%

0.00%

88.05%

10.60%

1.35%

76.43%

22.30%

1.27%

0.3 max average re-identification
risk
0.2 max average re-identification
risk
0.1 max average re-identification
risk

Level 2
{*}

Table 34. Relative frequency of Race attribute values in different generalization levels
Level 0
Generalization Levels of Attribute “Race”
{original values}

Level 1
{*}

RU Generalization Algorithm

99.46%

0.54%

0.3 max average re-identification risk

100.00%

0.00%

0.2 max average re-identification risk

100.00%

0.00%

0.1 max average re-identification risk

100.00%

0.00%

Table 34 shows that our RU Generalization algorithm suppressed 0.54% of the Race attribute
values. Table 35 shows that in the generalized dataset obtained from our RU Generalization
algorithm, 0.47% of the Country attribute values are generalized to Africa, Asia, Europe, North
America, South America categories, and 5.56% of values are suppressed.
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Table 35. Relative frequency of Country attribute values in different generalization levels

Generalization Levels of Attribute
“Country”

Level 0
{original values}

Level 1
{Africa, Asia,
Europe,
North America,
South America}

RU Generalization Algorithm

93.97%

0.47%

5.56%

91.07%

8.93%

0.00%

88.05%

11.95%

0.00%

88.61%

10.12%

1.27%

0.3 max average re-identification
risk
0.2 max average re-identification
risk
0.1 max average re-identification
risk
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Level 2
{*}

6

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this study, we developed a novel privacy disclosure risk measure, at the records level, named
FADR, as a combined measure of identity and attribute disclosure measure. FADR considers all
possible external knowledge and disclosure target and provides the flexibility in modeling different
adversaries. A pruning algorithm is developed to handle the calculation efficiency of FADR
measure. A set of experiments have been conducted to show the effectiveness of the pruning
algorithm on the efficiency of FADR calculation and the robustness of FADR measure to the small
changes on the input parameters.
In addition, we developed RU Generalization algorithm to obtain an optimized generalized dataset.
Unlike the anonymization algorithms in the literature that satisfy a pre-defined privacy level by
incurring the minimum information loss, our RU Generalization algorithm aims at minimizing the
combination of both disclosure risk and information loss. Our algorithm is a greedy heuristic
algorithm that targets the records at high disclosure risk and applies generalization on such records
with the lowest information loss. We used our developed FADR measure as the disclosure risk
metric in our RU Generalization algorithm since FADR enables our generalization algorithm to
consider different adversaries and address both identity and attribute disclosure attacks.
We compared our RU Generalization algorithm with the Flash benchmark generalization
algorithm that is implemented in ARX anonymization tool. Through a set of experiments, we have
shown that our RU Generalization algorithm outperforms the Flash algorithm with respect to
significant reduction in the maximum record’s disclosure risk and total information loss. Flash
algorithm has shown better efficiency than our algorithm, due to the pruning strategy that is
applicable for in ARX privacy models. However, the privacy model of disclosure risk in ARX
only considers the identity disclosure, whereas our FADR measure addresses the attribute
disclosure attack as well.
Our developed FADR measure can be extended to include different privacy requirements. One
future work direction of this study is to address homogeneity and similarity attacks in FADR
measure. The consequence term in FADR can add penalties to records being threatened by such
attacks. In addition, our RU Generalization algorithm requires improvements in efficiency. We
can integrate the generalization lattice and pruning strategy of the Flash algorithm into our RU
Generalization algorithm to reduce the computation complexity of our algorithm.
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